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Articles
BRAVE NEW WORLD: U.S. RESPONSES TO THE RISE IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIME-AN OVERVIEW
JOHN F. MURPHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE theme for this year's Villanova Law Review symposium, Brave New
World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crime, is broad in scope,
and papers presented in a one day symposium I cannot be expected to
cover more than a small part of so vast a subject. The organizers of the
symposium2 hope, however, that the topics covered by the three panels of
the symposium 3 address many of the salient issues raised by this "Brave
New World" of international crime. Whether this hope has been realized,
we leave to the readers' judgment of the articles contained in this sympo-
sium issue of the law review.
As indicated by the title, the goal of this Article is to provide a bird's-
eye view of the theme of the symposium. This Article first considers why
one should evaluate the current situation of international crime as a
"Brave New World," focusing primarily on international terrorism, interna-
tional drug trafficking and the relationship between the two in the form of
"narco-terrorism." The Article next examines various U.S. responses to
the rise in international crime and attempts to identify some of the pri-
mary issues raised by these responses. No attempt is made, however, to
explore these issues in exhaustive fashion; rather, the issues are posed and
citations provided for more extensive treatment of them. Also, in some
instances, these issues are canvassed thoroughly by other articles in this
* Professor of Law, Villanova University. I am indebted to Brooke Haley and
J. Ryan Hall, both second year students at the Villanova University School of Law,
for able research assistance with this Article.
1. The symposium was held on October 23, 2004.
2. Professor Steven Chanenson and I were the organizers of the 2004
symposium.
3. Panel I was on "The Brave New World of International Crime: An Intro-
duction;" Panel II was on "Combating the Financing of International Crime;" and
Panel III was on "Controversies Raised by U.S. Responses to the Rise in Interna-
tional Crimes."
(375)
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symposium. In a concluding section, the Article makes a few brief observa-
tions about possible future developments.
II. WHAT BRAvE NEW WORLD?
In Brave New World,4 Aldous Huxley created a dystopia in which the
people who govern use scientific means to ensure social stability through a
benevolent dictatorship. He envisaged a highly efficient state in which the
all-powerful executive of political bosses and their army of managers con-
trol a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they
love their servitude. Huxley wrote his novel in 1931, during the depres-
sion, when the nightmare was too little order. In the future projected in
Brave New World, the nightmare was too much order.
Huxley was of the view that control, through the punishment of unde-
sirable behavior, is less effective in the long run compared to control
through the reinforcement of desirable behavior by rewards. For exam-
ple, Huxley believed that government by terror works, on the whole, not as
well as government administered through the non-violent manipulation of
the environment and of the thoughts and feelings of individual men, wo-
men and children. 5 Writing in 1958, he believed that recent develop-
ments in Russia, such as Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 disclosure of the crimes
of the Stalin era, and recent advances in science and technology, had
robbed George Orwell's 1984 of "some of its gruesome verisimilitude." 6
The dystopia envisioned by the "new" terrorists, especially Osama bin
Laden and A] Qaeda, is a mixture of Aldous Huxley, George Orwell and
some new, creative dimensions. An especially disquieting aspect of the
new terrorism is the increased willingness of terrorists to kill large num-
bers of people and to make no distinction between military and civilian
targets. 7 Until recently many commentators were of the view that ter-
rorists had little interest in killing large numbers of people because it
would undermine their efforts to gain sympathy for their cause. A major
cause of this radical change in attitude has been aptly pinpointed by Jef-
frey D. Simon:
Al Qaeda... is representative of the emergence of the religious-
inspired terrorist groups that have become the predominant
form of terrorism in recent years. One of the key differences
between religious-inspired terrorists and politically motivated
4. ALDous HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Perennial Library ed., 1965) (1932).
5. ALDous HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REvisrrED 2-3 (Perennial Library ed.,
1965) (1958).
6. Id. at 2.
7. It is worth noting that in 1998 Osama bin Laden told ABC News that "he
made no distinction between American military and civilian targets, despite the
fact that the Koran itself is explicit about the protections offered to civilians." See
Peter L. Bergen, Excerpts from Holy War, Inc., 82 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 26, 28
(2002).
376 [Vol. 50: p. 375
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ones is that the religious-inspired terrorists have fewer constraints
in thcir minds about killing large numbers of people. All nonbe-
lievers are viewed as the enemy, and the religious terrorists are
less concerned than political terrorists about a possible backlash
from their supporters if they kill large numbers of innocent peo-
ple. The goal of the religious terrorist is transformation of all
society to their religious beliefs, and they believe that killing infi-
dels or nonbelievers will result in their being rewarded in the
afterlife. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's goal was to drive U.S. and
Western influences out of the Middle East and help bring to
power radical Islamic regimes around the world. In February
1998, bin Laden and allied groups under the name "World Is-
lamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" issued a
fatwa, which is a Muslim religious order, stating that it was the
religious duty of all Muslims to wage war on U.S. citizens, military
and civilian, anywhere in the world.8
It is important to note that there are other religious terrorist groups
besides Al Qaeda. Examples include Hizbollah, a radical Shia Islamic
group in Lebanon, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Pales-
tine Islamic Jihad, all of whom use terrorism in the West Bank, Gaza Strip
and Israel to undermine Middle East peace negotiations and to establish a
fundamentalist Islamic Palestine State. There are also the Abu Sayyaf
Group, a radical Islamic separatist group operating in the southern Philip-
pines; Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), which is based in Egypt and
seeks to overthrow the Egyptian government; and the Armed Islamic
Group, which is located in Algeria and plots the overthrow of the secular
Algerian government and its replacement with an Islamic State.
In their willingness to kill large numbers of their enemies, Al Qaeda
and other Islamic fundamentalist terror groups have adopted a Stalinist
tack. Like the Marxist-Leninist dogma adopted by Stalin, they promise
their members a utopia once their enemies have been defeated and Is-
lam's past greatness has been restored.9 According to The 9/11 Commission
Report, " [t] he extreme Islamist version of history blames the decline from
Islam's golden age on the rulers and people who turned away from the
true path of their religion, thereby leaving Islam vulnerable to encroach-
ing foreign powers eager to steal their land, wealth and even their souls." 10
In the modern context, the rulers who have turned away from the
true path of Islam include the rulers of Muslim countries, most especially
the rulers of Saudi Arabia, where Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed
8. Jeffery D. Simon, The Global Terrorist Threat, 82 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 10, 11
(2002).
9. For a discussion of bin Laden's world view, see THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 47-55 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
10. Id. at 50.
2005]
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and Islam's holiest city, is located. The primary encroaching foreign
power is the United States, with its placement of troops in Saudi Arabia
being a particular source of outrage. In the view of bin Laden and Al
Qaeda, according to The 9/11 Commission Report
America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus,
Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when
Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri
Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Mus-
lims in its southern islands. America is also held responsible for
the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as
"your agents." Bin Laden has stated flatly, "our fight against
these governments is not separate from our fight against you."
These charges found a ready audience among millions of Arabs
and Muslims angry at the United States because of issues ranging
from Iraq to Palestine to America's support for their countries'
repressive rulers.1 '
In Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, sexual license and a tranquilizer
drug called "soma" serve to keep the repressed populace 'content with its
fate. If the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan is any indication, no such sexual
freedom would be permitted in the Brave New World of Al Qaeda. But it
is worth noting that promises of sexual promiscuity in the afterlife (seventy
virgins) serve as inducements to the troops of Islamist fundamentalists,
especially those willing to serve as suicide bombers.
Some of Aldous Huxley's observations in Brave New World Revisited
may serve to enlighten us on the ambivalent, yet ultimately negative views
of Islamic fundamentalists on sexual freedom. In comparing Brave New
World with George Orwell's 1984, Huxley notes:
[I] n 1984, the members of the Party are compelled to conform to
a sexual ethic of more than Puritan severity. In Brave New World,
on the other hand, all are permitted to indulge their sexual im-
pulses without let or hindrance. The society described in
Orwell's fable is a society permanently at war, and the aim of its
rulers is first, of course, to exercise power for its own delightful
sake and, second, to keep their subjects in that state of constant
tension which a state of constant war demands of those who wage
it. By crusading against sexuality the bosses are able to maintain
the required tension in their followers and at the same time can
satisfy their lust for power in a most gratifying way. The society
described in Brave New World is a world-state, in which war has
been eliminated and where the first aim of the rulers is at all
costs to keep their subjects from making trouble. This they
achieve by (among other methods) legalizing a degree of sexual
11. Id. at 51.
[Vol. 50: p. 375
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freedom (made possible by the abolition of the family) that prac-
tically guarantees against any form of destructive (or creative)
emotional tension for the Brave New Worlders. In 1984 the lust
for power is satisfied by inflicting pain; in Brave New World, it is
satisfied by inflicting a hardly less humiliating pleasure.
1 2
Islamic fundamentalists are, of course, in a constant state of war with,
among others, the United States and the West, the rulers of Muslim coun-
tries and Muslims not subscribing to their fundamentalist beliefs.
Huxley also had some insightful things to say about the role of propa-
ganda in a dictatorship. He noted that:
[P]hilosophy teaches us to feel uncertain about the things that
seem to us self-evident. Propaganda, on the other hand, teaches
us to accept as self-evident matters about which it would be rea-
sonable to suspend our judgment or to feel doubt .... The dem-
agogic propagandist must therefore be consistently dogmatic.
All his statements are made without qualification. There are no
grays in his picture of the world; everything is either diabolically
black or celestially white.' 3
This certainly describes the propaganda of Al Qaeda, as well as that of
other Islamic fundamentalist terror groups.
Recently, moreover, these groups have made good use of modem
technology in propagating their message. Initially, the Arabic satellite
channels served as their primary conduit of information and communica-
tion. But lately, it appears the Internet has replaced these satellite chan-
nels for this purpose. According to one report, there are now more than
four thousand terrorist Web sites.1 4 Because the Internet is anonymous, it
is difficult for law enforcement or intelligence officials to trace the source
of the messages.
Ironically, it may be that the United States and coalition forces' inva-
sion of Afghanistan, which caused the dispersal of Al Qaeda forces, led to
greater use of the Internet by Islamic fundamentalist forces. One author-
ity has suggested that Al Qaeda now has four different networks. 15 The
original network, the one that committed the 9/11 attacks, uses its own
resources and people it has recruited and trained. The second is an ad
hoc terrorist network composed of franchise organizations that Al Qaeda
created in such countries as the Philippines, Jordan and Algeria. The
third is the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Crusaders and Jews, an
umbrella organization for Islamic terror groups from Morocco to China.
12. HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD REVISITED, supra note 5, at 21.
13. Id. at 36.
14. See Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web, THE NEw YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 40,
50.
15. The authority is Gustavo de Aristegui, a leader of the Popular Party in
Spain's Basque country and a student of the rise of Islamic terror. See id. at 44.
2005]
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Fourth, and last, there are imitators who are ideologically aligned with Al
Qaeda, but less tied to it financially. Reportedly, these imitators are the
ones who committed the train bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004.16
To be sure, Al Qaeda has apparently not yet been able to recruit all
Islamic terror groups into its terror network. Specifically, Hamas and
Hizbollah have reportedly so far resisted joining.17 Although there are no
doubt various reasons for this resistance, a primary reason may be that (so
far) Hamas and Hizbollah have limited their terrorist attack to Israel and
Israeli targets; whereas, as we have seen, Al Qaeda focuses primarily on the
United States and Muslim countries, whose governments it seeks to
overthrow.
18
The overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the removal of the
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq are two spectacular examples of a general
trend: the decline in state-sponsored terrorism. Of the seven states that
remain on the U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors of terror-
ism, 19 Libya and Sudan have recently taken significant steps to cooperate
in the war on terrorism and have moved away from their past support of
terrorist movements. 20 Iraq, while currently still on the list, surely will be
removed in the near future. Cuba, while opposed to the U.S.-led coalition
prosecuting the war on terrorism, and actively critical of many associated
U.S. policies and actions throughout 2003, limited its support of terrorism
to serving as a sanctuary for several terrorists and dozens of fugitives from
U.S. justice.2 1 North Korea declined to cooperate in any steps to combat
terrorism, but it is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. It has recently been suggested that the March 11, 2004, bombings in Ma-
drid were the first salvo by Islamic fundamentalists in a war against Europe in gen-
eral and Spain in particular. According to Florentino Portero, a political analyst at
el Grupo de Estudios Estrategicos, in Madrid, as quoted by Lawrence Wright:
The real problem of Spain for Al Qaeda is that we are a neighbor of Arab
countries-Morocco and Algeria-and we are a model of economy, de-
mocracy, and secularism .... We support the transformation and West-
ernization of the Middle East. We defend the Transition of Morocco
from a monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. We are allies of the ene-
mies of Al Qaeda in the Arab world. This point is not clearly understood
by the Spanish people. We are a menace to Al Qaedajust because of who
we are.
Id. at 53.
19. As of June 1, 2004, the states on the Department of State's list were: Iran,
North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba and Sudan. CRS Report for Congress, The
Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Re-
lated Issues (June 1, 2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/33630.pdf.
20. See U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003: Overview of State
Sponsored Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
21. In fact, in April 2003, the Cuban government executed three Cubans who
attempted to hijack a ferry to the United States, and, in 2001, became a party to all
twelve global international conventions relating to terrorism. Id.
[Vol. 50: p. 375380
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bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. Syria has continued to pro-
vide political and material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups on
the ground that their activities do not constitute terrorism but rather legit-
imate armed resistance to Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. On
the other hand, Syria has not been implicated directly in any act of terror-
ism since 1986. In 2003, Syria returned a sought after terrorist planner to
U.S. custody and made efforts to tighten its borders with Iraq to limit the
movement of anti-coalition foreign fighters into Iraq.2 2 Only Iran re-
mained an active sponsor of terrorism in 2003.
This decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, and especially in state
financing of terrorism, forced terrorist groups to turn to other sources of
financing. These sources of financing are considered in detail in other
articles in this symposium. 23 For present purposes, it suffices to note that
terrorist groups have looked increasingly at drug trafficking as a source of
revenue. 24 And a rich mother lode it has been. According to reports,
U.N. sources have recently estimated that the annual proceeds of the drug
trade come to 500 billion U.S. dollars around the world.2 5 Moreover, the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency claims that thirty-nine percent of the De-
partment of State's list of designated terrorist organizations have some de-
gree of connection with drug activities. 26 The connections between
terrorist organizations and drug traffickers take many forms, ranging from
facilitation to direct trafficking by the terrorist organization itself to fi-
nance its activities. The relationship is highly symbiotic. The drug traf-
fickers benefit from the terrorists' military skills, weapons supply and
access to clandestine organizations. The terrorists gain a source of reve-
nue and expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of proceeds from illicit
transactions. Both use similar means to conceal profits and fund raising. 27
Latin America has been a fertile area for the fund raising activities for
Hizbollah and Hamas, as well as other terrorist groups, especially "in the
triborder area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where terrorists raise
millions of dollars annually via criminal enterprises." 28 They generate sig-
nificant income by controlling the sale of various types of contraband in
this area, including drugs, liquor, cigarettes, weapons and forged docu-
22. A move that was not very successful. Id.
23. See Herbert Morais, 50 VILL. L. REv. 583 (2005);Joy Smallwood, 50 VILL.
L. REv. 645 (2005); Bruce Zagaris, 50 VILL. L. REv. 509 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Southeastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center
Anti-Terrorism Task Force, Narco-Terrorism (Global and Regional Overview) (Mar. 8,
2004), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2004/03/2245en.pdf.
25. Id.
26. See News from Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Statement of Steven W
Casteel, Assistant Administrator Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 20,
2003) [hereinafter News from DEA], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/
cngrtest/ ct052003.html.
27. See SECI Center Anti-Terrorism Task Force, supra note 24.
28. U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 44 (May, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/.
2005]
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ments. Reportedly, a large sum of the earnings from these illegal activities
goes to support the operatives' respective organizations in Lebanon.
29
There have been allegations of Al Qaeda activity in Latin America, but
these have remained uncorroborated.
The severity of the September 11, 2001 attacks and of the subsequent
use of military force by United States and select North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) forces against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghani-
stan, as well as the highly controversial use of force to remove the Saddam
Hussein regime in Iraq, have raised an issue as to the appropriate legal
regime to apply efforts to control international terrorism. Prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001, international terrorism had been treated primarily as a
criminal law matter with emphasis placed on preventing the commission
of the crime through intelligence or law enfoi'cement means; or, if preven-
tion failed, on the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of the
perpetrators.
To be sure, the United States previously used armed force on occa-
sion against terrorism. In 1986, the United States bombed Tripoli, Libya
in response to Libya's apparent involvement in the bombing of a West
Berlin discotheque frequented by American soldiers, and terrorist attacks
by Libyan backed Abu Nidal on El Al airline counters, that ultimately
killed five Americans and wounded many others. Similarly, in 1993, the
United States bombed Baghdad, Iraq, because of an assassination plot by
Saddam Hussein against former President George H.W. Bush. Again, in
1998, the United States engaged in missile strikes against Afghanistan and
the Sudan in response to the East African embassy bombings. But none of
these actions involved military force of the magnitude and duration of the
actions in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. Hence, after September
11, 2001, the law of armed conflict assumed a much greater prominence
than it had previously in efforts to combat international terrorism.
But the law of armed conflict has hardly occupied the field. On the
contrary, the issue now may be whether, under any particular circum-
stances, the law of armed conflict or international criminal law applies.
Also, it is important to note, in the wake of September 11, 2001, various
fields of law and methodologies for combating international terrorism
have come to the fore. These include, among others, immigration and
refugee law, international human rights law, international finance, U.S.
constitutional law, private remedies, especially civil lawsuits, cyber law, pri-
vacy, homeland security, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, in-
telligence gathering and public health law.30 No one person, of course,
can possibly establish a mastery over all of these disparate fields of law and
methodologies for combating terrorism.
29. See News from DEA, supra note 26.
30. For a sense of the breadth and depth of subjects now relevant to efforts to
combat terrorism, see the series of articles contained in the lengthy symposium on
Law and the War on Terrorism, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y ix-834 (2002).
[Vol. 50: p. 375382
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What then are the most salient characteristics of this Brave New
World of international crime? Perhaps the most salient, as well as the
most worrisome, characteristic is the ambiguous nature of the threat it
poses. Although it is clear that the destructive capability of the criminals,
especially of terrorists, has greatly increased within the last decade or two,
the exact magnitude of this destructive capability is unclear. It is unclear,
for example, whether Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups have the capabil-
ity effectively to employ weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical
or biological-or, if they have the capability, whether they are planning to
use it.3 1 With increasing evidence of technological capabilities of ter-
rorists in the use of computers, some commentators have claimed that
terrorists now have the capacity for hijacking satellites. "Capturing signals
beamed from space [it is alleged] terrorists could devastate the communi-
cations industry, shut down power grids, and paralyze the ability of devel-
oped countries to defend themselves."32
The ambiguity of the threat of international crime is also demon-
strated by its worldwide expansion. Al Qaeda allegedly operates in more
than sixty countries.3 3 It is not the only example, however. Hizbollah re-
portedly has operations on six continents, and Hamas and the Sri Lankan
Tigers of Tamil Eelam are said to "maintain cells far from the lands where
their goals and grievances are focused. 3 4 This dispersal of terrorist opera-
tions makes it extremely difficult to predict where the next attack will
come from in order to take steps to prevent it.35
Another salient characteristic of the Brave New World of interna-
tional crime is the willingness of the criminals to engage in any means
whatsoever, no matter how brutal, to achieve their goals. Hostage taking is
a tactic long employed by common criminals, as well as by terrorists, to
31. For a discussion of so-called "catastrophic terrorism," see Barry Kellman,
Catastrophic Terrorism-Thinking Fearfully, Acting Legally, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 537
(1999).
32. See Wright, supra note 14, at 51-52. For some of my views on the threat of
computer attacks by terrorists, see John F. Murphy, Computer Network Attacks by Ter-
rorists: Some Legal Dimensions, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 321 (Michael H. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002).
33. See Special Report: Seeing the World Anew; The Diplomatic Repercussions, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 19.
34. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach
Worldwide, 19 THE BROOINGS REV. 34 (2001).
35. At this writing, the U.S. government has raised the terror alert at several
financial institutions in the New York City and Washington, D.C. areas. Yet much
of the information that was the basis for this action is three or four years old, and it
is not clear whether a terrorist plot or preparatory surveillance operations are still
underway. But intelligence and law enforcement officials have defended their ac-
tions by noting that the reconnaissance already conducted has provided Al Qaeda
with the knowledge necessary to carry out the attacks against the sites in Manhat-
tan, Washington and Newark and that Al Qaeda has often struck years after its
operatives began surveillance of an intended target. See Douglas Jehl & David
Johnston, Reports That Led to Terror Alert Were Years Old, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2004, at Al, col.1.
20051
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achieve their goals, which, more often than not, has involved the payment
of ransom to achieve the release of the hostages.3 6 And the hostage takers
have, on a number of occasions, been willing to kill their hostages if their
demands are not met. The recent hostage taking by the insurgents in
Iraq, however, which has largely involved foreign civilian workers on re-
construction projects, has set a new standard for brutality with beheadings
of hostages being recorded on videos and broadcast on the Internet or on
Arab television stations as a warning to their employers to cease their activ-
ities in Iraq. At this writing, this tactic is enjoying a substantial measure of
success.3 7 Suicide bombings against civilians are another popular tactic
utilized by the insurgents in Iraq, as well as by the Palestinians in Israel.
An especially disquieting aspect of the current situation is the lack of
forceful objection on the part of Muslim leaders, including those in the
United States, to such barbarity. In the words of a leading scholar of Is-
lam, "where are the fatwas condemning such barbaric crimes as the be-
heading of hostages or suicide-bombing?" 38 Failure on the part of Muslim
leaders to protest the barbaric acts of Islamic fundamentalists lends a mea-
sure of support to Samuel Huntington's controversial thesis of a "clash of
civilizations" that will destabilize the twenty-first century.
39
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World envisaged the elimination of war,
but at the cost of elimination of individual freedoms. Some critics of U.S.
responses to the rise in Islamic terrorism believe that these responses
gravely endanger the freedoms that the United States is supposedly de-
fending. 40 The validity of this thesis is examined by several of the partici-
pants in this symposium, 41 and some of the primary issues it raises are
highlighted later in this paper.
It is time to turn to some U.S. responses to the rise in international
crime and to attempt to identify some of the most salient issues they raise.
These responses include, in the order of their consideration: steps toward
the prevention, prosecution and punishment of international crimes; com-
bating international terrorism through civil liability suits; and coercive
36. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see JOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERROR-
ISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1990).
37. See, e.g., Hostage Turk Is Killed; Truckers Quit Iraq Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2004, at A8, col.1.
38. See Eric Ormsby, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://
www.opinion journal.com/la/?id=110005440 (reviewing FEISAL ABDUL RAUF,
WHAT'S RIGHT WITH ISLAM (2004)).
39. See Samuel P. Huntington, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAK-
ING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
40. See DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999);
George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name
of National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 35 (2003) (book review).
41. See Patricia Bellia, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425 (2005); David P. Stewart, 50 VILL.
L. REV. 685 (2005); David Warner, 50 VILL. L. REv. 479 (2005).
[Vol. 50: p. 375384
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measures against state sponsors of terrorism other than the use of armed
force.
III. PREVENTION, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
A. Prevention
Ideally, the goal of law enforcement is to prevent international crimes
from being carried out. There are two primary methods for preventing
the commission of international crimes: (1) the hardening of possible
targets; and (2) the use of intelligence gathered by intelligence agents and
of information resulting from investigations by law enforcement officials
to intercept criminals before they can commit their crimes. Examples of
the hardening of possible targets are the barricades that surround Con-
gress and key governmental agencies in Washington, D.C. and other pri-
mary possible targets such as financial institutions in New York City and
Newark, New Jersey or nuclear facilities in various locations in the United
States. The screening of passengers and baggage on civilian aircraft flights
for weapons or bombs is another example. Special problems surround
efforts to harden computer networks against attack because of their
vulnerability.
4 2
The gathering of intelligence and investigations for law enforcement
purposes has both an international and domestic dimension. Although
there is increasing international cooperation in intelligence gathering and
42. Electronic vulnerabilities are often harder to guard against attack than are
"traditional" vulnerabilities. Part of the problem is the vastness and complexity of
the information infrastructure. As of 1996, for example, the defense establishment
reportedly had over 211 million computers, 1,000 local networks and 100 long-
distance networks. See Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense
Pose Increasing Risks, Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, at 5 (May 22, 1996),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96084.pdf. Moreover, although it
is clear that this infrastructure is subjected to a large number of attacks, the num-
ber of reported incidents is probably just the tip of the iceberg because, according
to estimates, only about one in 150 attacks is actually detected and reported. Id.
The same pattern is likely present in other sectors of the U.S. government and in
the vast private sector.
Security technologies and products may afford some protection, but they are
hardly foolproof. Some examples are firewalls and smart cards. "Firewalls are
hardware and software components that protect one set of system resources (e.g.,
host systems, local area networks) from attack by outside network users (e.g., In-
ternet users) by blocking and checking all incoming network traffic." Id. at 4 n.2.
"Smart cards are access cards containing encoded information and sometimes a
microprocessor and a user interface. The encoded information and/or the infor-
mation generated by the processor are used to gain access to a computer system or
facility." Id. at 4 n.3. Additionally, as new security tools are developed, computer
network attackers learn how to defeat them or exploit other vulnerabilities.
Human failings greatly compound the problem, as when inexperienced or
untrained users accidentally publicize their passwords, or weak passwords are cho-
sen which can be easily guessed. Accordingly, it is generally agreed that training in
information security for personnel, including top management, is a crucial ele-
ment for a good information-systems security program.
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sharing at the international level, this area is currently largely unregulated
in international law. 43 At both the international and domestic levels,
there are serious problems regarding a lack of cooperation; it is rather a
"fratricidal war between intelligence services and the law enforcement
agencies."44
On a global basis, an important player is Interpol, the International
Police Organization. According to Interpol, "strict limits on intelligence
sharing are hindering efforts by law enforcement agencies to understand
how the global threat is changing."45 Countries tend to share information
only on a bilateral basis because the originating country can thereby con-
trol the flow of information, protect its sources and ensure the informa-
tion is not passed on to third countries without their permission.
The March 11, 2004 bombings in Madrid, Spain created pressure for
a different approach. After March 11, 2004, the European Union created
the post of terrorism coordinator to improve sharing among European
states. Still, there are reportedly problems with Europol, the European
Police Office, which began operations in 1999 and is based in The Hague.
Europol has been plagued by disputes over who should head the agency,
and also has had to deal with varying levels of support for the agency.
Reportedly, Germany and the United Kingdom provide four-fifths of
Europol's data.46 Currently, almost half of Europol's work involves fight-
ing drug and human trafficking, but after March 11, 2004, counter-terror-
ism is receiving increased attention. The United States is apparently
bringing increased pressure on the agency to improve its operations.
4 7
At the domestic level, in the United States, there has long been a
separation between intelligence gathering agencies, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, and investigation for law enforcement purposes, such
as by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In both cases, there has been
concern that there not be arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy,
family, home or correspondence. Thus, wiretapping, interception of cor-
respondence and searches of private property constitute invasions of pri-
vacy. These invasions of privacy may be justified by threats to national
security, such as Al Qaeda, but arguably should be subject to judicial su-
pervision.4 s The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot)
43. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES: A REPORT
BY THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASsoCIATION'S TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
iSM 62 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSES].
44. See Mark Huban, Interpol Urges More Sharing of Terror Intelligence, FIN. TIMES,
June 8, 2004, at 5, col 3.
45. Id.
46. Raphael Minder, Europol Dispute Knocks Pledge to Co-Ordinate Terrorism Fight,
FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at 4, col.5.
47. Id.
48. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note
43, at 62.
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Act,49 however, places significant limits on the ability of judges to curtail
the activities of law enforcement officials. For example, under Section 215
of the Act, the FBI may apply for a court order requiring the production
of "any tangible things," including medical, financial or library records,
from any person, upon a written statement that these items are being
sought for an investigation "to protect against international terrorism."
50
In such a case, judges have no authority to refuse the order once the order
is received. Section 217 of the Act goes even further. Under it, Internet
service providers, universities and network administrators can authorize,
without a judicial order, the surveillance of anyone who accesses a com-
puter without authorization. 5 1
A traditional reason for placing limits on sharing information be-
tween intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials is the risk of
violating the right to privacy and introducing into criminal proceedings
evidence from secret sources, such as informants, not available in full to
defendants. In November 2002, however, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review reversed a unanimous decision of the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court that rejected, in part, proposed Department of
Justice procedures designed to permit the complete exchange of informa-
tion between intelligence and law enforcement officials. 52
The Court of Review's decision reinstated the Justice Department's
guidelines and thereby all but eliminated the wall between intelligence
collection and law enforcement. The decision has been criticized. 53 Pro-
fessor Patricia Bellia's contribution to this symposium discusses the For-
49. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2004).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004). These and other provisions of the USA Patriot
Act are critically examined in STANLEY MAILMAN ET AL., UNITING AND STRENGTHEN-
ING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OB-
sTRUCT TERRORISM (USA PATRIOT ACT) ACT OF 2001: AN ANALYSIS (2002). Some
other writings on the Act, most of them critical, include Lisa Finnegan Abdolian &
Harold Takooshian, The USA Patriot Act: Civil Liberties, the Media, and Public Opinion,
30 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1429 (2003); Michael F. Dowley, Government Surveillance Pow-
ers Under the USA Patriot Act: Is It Possible to Protect National Security and Privacy at the
Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SuFroLK U. L. REv. 165 (2002); Drew
Fennell, The USA Patriot Act: Can We Be Both Safe and Free?, 21 DEL. LAW. 10 (2003);
Lawrence M. Leibowitz & Ira. L. Podheiser, A Summary of Changes in Immigration
Policies and Practices After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: The USA Patriot Act
and Other Measures, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 873 (2002); Rita Shulman, USA Patriot Act:
Granting the U.S. Government the Unprecedented Power to Circumvent American Civil Lib-
erties in the Name of National Security, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 427 (2003); and
Jeremy C. Smith, The USA Patriot Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Pro-
tected by the Forth Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82 N.C. L. REv. 412
(2003).
52. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
53. See, e.g., William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveil-
lance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147 (2003).
2005] 387
13
Murphy: Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crim
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended by the USA Patriot Act, in
substantial detail.
54
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report) emphasizes the failure
of intelligence agents and law enforcement officials to share information
("connect the dots") that might have resulted in apprehending the 9/11
hijackers prior to commission of their acts. 55 It stresses the "importance
of intelligence analysis that can draw on all relevant sources of informa-
tion. The biggest impediment to all-source analysis-to a greater likeli-
hood of connecting the dots-is the human or systemic resistance to
sharing information."56 In the 9/11 Commission's view, "[a]gencies up-
hold a 'need to know' culture of information protection rather than pro-
moting a 'need-to-share' culture of integration." To change this culture,
the Commission recommends that "[i] nformation procedures should pro-
vide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security
and shared knowledge."
57
If intelligence agents or law enforcement officials are unsuccessful in
preventing the criminal attack, the focus shifts to efforts to apprehend the
perpetrators and subject them to prosecution and punishment. As we
shall see in the next section of this Article, these efforts may raise a host of
both legal and moral issues.
B. Apprehension
By definition, an "international" criminal may be located in a great
variety of locations. Thus, the perpetrators of an international criminal
act are often difficult to locate, especially if, as is often the case with inter-
national terrorists, the perpetrators are aided and abetted by an organiza-
tion like Al Qaeda or by a state sponsor of terrorism.
Colleagues or friends of alleged perpetrators are often interrogated
to gain information about their possible whereabouts. The scope of limi-
tations on coercive interrogation techniques is a highly controversial issue.
It has become especially controversial because of recent revelations that
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel sent memorandums
to the White House in January and August of 2002 (superseded in Decem-
ber of 2004)58 approving interrogation tactics that stopped just short of a
54. See Bellia, supra note 41.
55. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 73-82.
56. Id. at 416.
57. Id. at 417.
58. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Applica-
tion of Treaties and Law to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 25, 2002), avail-
able at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek/ [hereinafter Treaties
Memo]; Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct of Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A (Dec.
30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (supersed-
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prisoner's death and arguably constituted torture or at the least "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment." Such tactics are prohibited by the
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, 59 to which the United States is a party.
The August 2002 (superseded in December 2004) memorandum also
claimed that, in any event, the domestic statute criminalizing the commis-
sion of torture outside of the United States60 could be overridden by the
President acting under his Commander-in-Chief Power. In the words of
the memorandum, "[e]ven if an interrogation arguably were to violate
[the criminal statute], the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermis-
sibly encroached on the President's constitutional power to conduct a mil-
itary campaign." 6 1  Accordingly, the memorandum concludes, "if
executive officials were subject to prosecution for conducting interroga-
tions when they were carrying out the President's Commander-in-Chief
powers, 'it would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the Presi-
dent's ability to fulfill his constitutional duties.'"62
The revelations of these memorandums, coming as they did in the
wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, precipitated a flurry of sharp reactions,
from both ends of the political spectrum, rejecting the arguments set forth
in the memorandums. 6 3 The sharply circumscribed definition of torture
set forth in the memorandums received especially severe criticism. As
noted by Ruth Wedgwood and James Woolsey:
ing August 1, 2002 opinion outlining applicable Standards of Conduct) [hereinaf-
ter Interrogation Memo].
59. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. OHCHR (1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2004) (making it criminal offense for any person
.outside the United States [to] commit[ ] or attempt[ ] to commit torture ...").
Section 2340 defines the act of torture as an "act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon
another person within his custody or physical control [.]" Id. § 2340(1); see id.
§ 2340A. Thus, to convict a defendant of torture, the prosecution must establish
that: (1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant acted
under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant's custody or physi-
cal control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause severe physical and or
mental pain or suffering; and (5) that the act inflicted severe physical or mental
pain or suffering.
61. See Interrogation Memo, supra note 58, at 31.
62. Id. at 35 (quoting Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive
Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 U.S. Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 101, 134 (1984)).
63. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST.
J., June 28, 2004, at A10. For other commentary, see Adam Liptak, How Far Can a
Government Lawyer Go?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, at 3; James Sterngold, Legal Ex-
perts Slam Torture Policy Process White House Rebuffed Memo Saying Bush Could Be Above
the Law (June 24, 2004), available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/
a/2004/06/24/MNG2 A7B8G91.DTL; and Kate Zemike, Defining Torture: Russian
Roulette, Yes. Mind-Altering Drugs, Maybe., N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 2004, at 7.
15
Murphy: Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crim
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
This diminished definition of the crime of torture will be quoted
back at the United States for the next several decades. It could
be misused by Al Qaeda defendants in the military commission
trials and by Saddam's henchmen. It does not serve America's
interest in a world in which dictators so commonly abuse their
people and quash their political opponents.
64
The memoranda also came under attack for their interpretations of
and allegedly dismissive attitude toward provisions of the Torture Conven-
tion and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. For example, Article 16 of
the Torture Convention requires each state to prevent "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" within its jurisdiction. 65 The August
1, 2002 (superseded December 30, 2004) memorandum 66 dismisses the
significance of this provision by noting that it does not require that state
parties provide criminal penalties for persons who commit such acts.
6 7
Wedgwood and Woolsey, however, point out that Article 16 "is still a legal
commitment to which we willingly have acceded .... We are not legally
free to choose cruel techniques just because they fall short of torture."68
The January 22, 2002 memorandum 69 is similarly dismissive of com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which sets forth mini-
mum protections for persons involved in an "armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties."70 According to the memorandum's analysis, common
64. Wedgwood & Woolsey, supra note 63.
65. Torture Convention provides in pertinent part:
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its juris-
diction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an offi-
cial capacity.
Torture Convention, supra note 59, art. 16 1.
66. See Interrogation Memo, supra note 58.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Wedgwood & Woolsey, supra note 63.
69. See Treaties Memo, supra note 58.
70. Common Article 3 is found in all four of the Geneva Conventions on the
Law of Armed Conflict of 1949. It reads in pertinent part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse dis-
tinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-men-
tioned persons:
[Vol. 50: p. 375
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Article 3 applies only to civil wars or to "a large scale armed conflict be-
tween a State and an armed movement within its own territory" and not to
a struggle for the control of Afghanistan.
71
A literal reading of common Article 3 supports the January 2002
memorandum's thesis because by its terms it appears to apply only to an
"armed conflict not of an international character," and Afghanistan was
clearly an international armed conflict. In 1986, however, a majority of
the International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case, held that "mini-
mum rules applicable to international and non-international conflicts" are
expressed in common Article 3.72 By contrast, in his dissenting opinion,
Judge Sir Robert Jennings suggested that the majority's view of common
Article 3 as a minimum standard of treatment "is not a matter free from
difficulty."73 For his part, Yoram Dinstein, an eminent authority on the
law of armed conflict, may have resolved this "difficulty" by his comment
on Sir Jennings' suggestion:
This is particularly true considering that the Court did not deem
it fit to produce any evidence for the conclusion that the provi-
sion reflects norms identically applicable to international and
non-international armed conflicts. Still, it can hardly be disputed
that when common Article 3 prohibits "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment", or
established the need to afford in trial "all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people", the
text reflects an irreducible minimum that no State is allowed to
rachet down even a notch in any armed conflict (whether inter-
national or non-international).7 4
In June 2004, the Department of Justice took the "unprecedented"
step of rescinding the August 2002 memorandum and pledged to review
other opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel that dealt with the treat-
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions with-
out pervious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Id.
71. See Treaties Memo, supra note 58.
72. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114
(June 27).
73. Id. at 528, 537 (Jennings, J., dissenting).
74. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 32 (2004).
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ment and interrogation of captured combatants. 75 Critics have claimed,
however, that the August 2002 memorandum gave potential abusers a
road map for how to avoid prosecution. 76
Difficulties in locating a criminal suspect may be especially severe in
cases where computers are used as a weapon. 77 Computer network attack-
ers can frustrate investigatory efforts by "looping and weaving" their at-
tacks through several foreign countries, thus greatly complicating the
efforts of investigators to follow their trail. If the suspect is located, it be-
comes necessary to induce law enforcement officials where he is located to
take him into custody. Local law enforcement, however, will not do so
unless the computer network attack in question is a crime under their
local law.78 This requirement must also be met as a condition of extradi-
tion because of the "double criminality" requirement in virtually all extra-
dition treaties.7 9
C. Prosecution and Punishment
If the suspect is apprehended abroad, the issue arises whether, and if
so where, he will be prosecuted. If the United States wishes to prosecute
him, it will seek his return, either through extradition or some other pro-
cess of "rendition" such as exclusion, deportation, or, in extreme cases,
abduction.80 Processes of rendition are explored elsewhere in this sympo-
sium. 8 1 For purposes of this Article, I will just note that the so-called anti-
terrorism conventions of the United Nations8 2 normally contain, as a basic
provision, an "extradite or prosecute" requirement. That is, a state party
that apprehends a person who allegedly committed the terrorist act cov-
75. See Wedgwood & Woolsey, supra note 63.
76. See Liptak, supra note 63.
77. For more detailed discussion of this and other problems associated with
computer network attacks, see Murphy, supra note 34, at 321-51.
78. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 88
(1996). According to Michael Sussman, then a Senior Attorney in the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department ofJustice, in 1962
U.S. efforts to get help from the Swiss in a case involving hackers from Switzerland
who attacked the San Diego Supercomputer Center were stymied because of a lack
of dual criminality. See Michael A. Sussman, The Critical Challenges from International
High-Tech and Computer Related-Crime at the Millennium, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
451, 463 (1999).
79. For discussion, see GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FuGITIVE OFFENDERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 104-16 (1998).
80. The most controversial case of a U.S. abduction involved Alvarez-Machain
from Mexico. The validity of this action, at least as a matter of U.S. law, was finally
determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655 (1992).
81. See Warner, supra note 41.
82. There are twelve such conventions at present, covering a variety of terror-
ist crimes, such as aircraft hijacking, hostage taking and terrorist bombings. The
texts of these twelve conventions are conveniently collected in INTERNATIONAL IN-
STRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM (United Nations 2001).
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ered by the convention must either extradite him to a state party seeking
his extradition or submit his case to its authorities for prosecution.8 3 Nor-
mally, the decision whether to extradite the accused or submit him to
prosecution is the sole discretion of the state party that has the accused in
custody. This discretion is not absolute, however, as was shown in the
quite extraordinary case of Libya and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
While it was on a flight from London to New York City on December
21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie,
Scotland, killing all 259 persons aboard, as well as 11 persons on the
ground.8 4 Based on evidence gathered during a long investigation, the
United States and the United Kingdom indicted two Libyan nationals in
1992 and demanded that they be turned over for prosecution to the
United States or the United Kingdom. 85 Libya declined to extradite, cit-
ing as reasons the lack of extradition treaties with either the United States
or the United Kingdom and a provision in its constitution prohibiting the
extradition of Libyan nationals. It also cited the Montreal Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,8 6 to
which all three states are parties, for the proposition that its only obliga-
tion under the convention was to investigate and, if appropriate, prose-
cute. Libya conducted an investigation and determined that it had an
inadequate basis to prosecute. Similarly, the Libyan government rejected
a request by the French government for the extradition of alleged Libyan
83. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
ings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998).
The Convention provides in pertinent part:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present
shall.., if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without excep-
tion whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its ter-
ritory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accor-
dance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their deci-
sion in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave
nature under the law of that state.
Id. art. 8 1.
84. For further discussion of the Lockerbie case, seeJErREx L. DUNOFF ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAw: NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESS, A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH
(2002).
85. The Libyan nationals were Abdelbasset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi and AI-
Amin Khalifa.
86. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Nov. 1, 1972, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. 565 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
Article 7 of the Convention provides:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception
whatsover and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory,
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prose-
cution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of
that state.
393A20051
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terrorists allegedly involved in the destruction of UTA Flight 772 in Sep-
tember 1989.
The three countries refused to accept the response of the Libyan gov-
ernment and referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council (the "Coun-
cil"). The Council adopted a resolution urging the Libyan government to
provide "full and effective" responses to requests made by the French, the
United Kingdom and the United States governments concerning these ca-
tastrophes.8 7 When the Libyan government failed to do so, the Council
decided that this failure constituted a threat to international peace and
security.88 Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Council
decided that states should adopt various sanctions against Libya unless it
responded to the requests for cooperation. To avoid these measures,
Libya also had to commit itself "definitely to cease all forms of terrorist
action and all assistance to terrorist groups and.. . promptly, by concrete
actions, demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism."8 9 In a third resolu-
tion, the Council applied further comprehensive sanctions against Libya
in 1993.90
In response, Libya invoked the co-promissory clause in the Montreal
Convention and instituted suit before the International Court of Justice
against the United States and the United Kingdom. 9 1 The United States
and the United Kingdom argued that any claim that Libya might have
under the Montreal Convention was superseded by the Security Council
resolutions because, under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, if there is a
conflict between the obligations of member states under the Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the Charter prevail. 92 The Court denied Libya's request for
87. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731
(1992).
88. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992).
89. Id.
90. S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3312d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883
(1993).
91. Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, April 14, 1992, Libya-U.K., 1992 I.C.J. 3; Ae-
rial Incident at Lockerbie, April 14, 1992, Libya-U.S., 1992 I.C.J. 114. Article 14,
paragraph 1 of the Montreal Convention, supra note 86, provides:
Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the in-
terpretation or application of this convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitra-
tion the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitra-
tion, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
Id.
92. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides: "In the event of a conflict be-
tween the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obli-
gations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art. 103, available
at http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
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provisional measures against further U.S. and British efforts to compel
Libya to surrender the accused, but it ruled that it had jurisdiction to con-
sider Libya's claims under the Montreal Convention. 9 3
After the Court's ruling, extensive discussions involving Libya, the
United States, the United Kingdom and the U.N. Secretary-General re-
sulted in an agreement in April 1999 by Libya to surrender the two ac-
cused Libyans to stand trial before Scottish judges sitting as a Scottish
court in the Netherlands. On January 31, 2001, one of the accused Liby-
ans was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal.9 4 The other accused Libyan was
acquitted.9 5
With the conclusion of the proceedings in the Netherlands, proceed-
ings in Libya's cases against the United States and the United Kingdom
remained pending before the International Court of Justice. A decision
on the merits by the court in these cases could have been of great signifi-
cance because Libya had challenged the sanctions imposed against it on
the ground that they were ultra vires. The first issue, therefore, was
whether the court was competent to sit in judgment of a Security Council
resolution in the absence of a request from the Council to do so. Had it
determined that it was competent, the court would have had to decide
whether the Council's resolutions against Libya exceeded its competence.
A court decision that the Council's resolutions exceeded its competence
would surely have infuriated both the United States and the United King-
dom and called into question the precise scope of Security Council au-
thority under Chapter VII of the Charter. Resolution of these issues,
however, was not to be. On September 10, 2003, the President of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, at the request of the parties, issued an order
discontinuing the proceedings before the court.9 6
The ultimate denouement of the Libya case, then, was quite extraordi-
nary. Because of economic and other pressures on Libya, the two individ-
uals accused of the terrorist bombing of the airplane were brought to
justice before a national court sitting in the territory of another country.
The result was that one of the accused was convicted, and his conviction
was affirmed on appeal, while the other accused was acquitted of the
charges. Although this extraordinary procedure is unlikely to set a prece-
dent, it did fulfill the primary goal of the antiterrorist conventions,
93. Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Feb. 27, 1998, Libya-U.S., 1998 I.C.J. 115.
94. See P. Finn, Libyan Convicted of Lockerbie Bombing: Second Man Acquitted in
Attack, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2002, at A].
95. Al Megrahi v. Her Majesty's Advocate, Appeal No. C104/01 (J.C. 2002)
(Scot.).
96. See International Court ofJustice (ICJ), Questions of Interpretation and Appli-
cation of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lib-
yan Arab Jamhiriya v. United Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States
of America), Cases Removed from the Court's List at the Joint Request of the Parties (Sept.
10, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/ipress-
com2003-29_luklus 20030910. htm.
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namely, that persons accused of crimes covered by the conventions be
prosecuted before the national courts of states parties in accordance with
procedures that safeguard their due process rights.
It is not at all clear, however, that this goal is met with any degree of
consistency. The conclusion of new, or even the ratification of old, an-
titerrorism conventions is not the crucial step in the counter-terrorism
process. The crucial step is vigorous implementation of the conventions,
encompassing more than merely ratifying the conventions, passing legisla-
tion and adopting the necessary administrative measures, such as creating
an appropriate legal infrastructure to combat international terrorism. It
requires taking active steps toward ensuring that the primary goals of the
conventions are met: preventing the crimes covered by the conventions
and prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators of the crimes. The re-
cord of the conventions in this respect is unclear.
A major part of the problem is the lack of adequate data on the ex-
tent of successful actions to prevent terrorist acts and of successful prose-
cutions of terrorists. Although there appears to be adequate data available
on the extradition, prosecution and punishment of aircraft hijackers, 97 in-
formation regarding other manifestations of terrorism is quite sparse.
Most of the antiterrorist conventions contain provisions that require the
state party where the alleged offender is prosecuted to communicate the
final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (or to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency or the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization),98
and the Secretary-General issued reports on "Measures to Eliminate Inter-
national Terrorism."99 But these reports focus primarily on the terrorist
events that triggered the conventions and on a summary of the most im-
portant provisions of these conventions. There appears to be little infor-
mation on the extent and success of efforts to either prevent the acts the
conventions cover or to prosecute the perpetrators of these acts.
There is some prospect that this situation will be remedied, although
not immediately. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373,100 discussed in
the articles addressing the combating of the financing of terrorism in this
symposium,10 1 "c]alls upon all States" to take a number of steps in coop-
97. At least this was the case around 1985 when I last examined the data. See
JOHN F. MuRP'HY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR POLICY INITIATIVES 110-15 (1985).
98. See, e.g., Article 19 of the International Convention on the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000).
99. See, e.g., Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Sec-
retary-General, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 153, U.N. Doc. A/51/336
(1996); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U.N. Doc. A/55/179 (2000).
100. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1373 (2001).
101. See Zagaris, supra note 23, at xx; Morais, supra note 23, at xx; Smallwood,
supra note 23, at xx.
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eration with other states to combat terrorism.' 0 2 These steps include, "in-
tensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information,"
becoming parties to the relevant antiterrorist conventions and ensuring,
"in conformity with international law," that refugee status is not abused by
terrorists, and that "claims of political motivation are not recognized as
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists."
Significantly, to monitor implementation of Resolution 1373, the
Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and called
upon all states to report to the committee-no later than ninety days after
the date of adoption of the resolution-on the steps they have taken to
implement the resolution.10 3 The Council further "[e]xpresse[d] its de-
termination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full imple-
mentation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under
the Charter."10 4 Similarly, AmbassadorJeremy Greenstock, the first chair-
man of the CTC, emphasized the importance of implementing antiter-
rorist measures. According to Ambassador Greenstock, prior to the
resolution "[g]overnments were already familiar with what needed to be
done. But few had done it. Resolution 1373 drew on the language negoti-
ated by all U.N. members in the twelve Conventions against terrorism, but
also delivered a strong operational message: get going on effective mea-
sures now."'
105
Reportedly, as of June 30, 2004, the committee had received 515 re-
ports from U.N. member states and others. 10 6 They included 160 second
reports from member states and two from non-member states, 116 third
reports from member states and 40 fourth reports from member states. 0 7
Even a cursory review of the reports submitted by member states with so-
phisticated law and order systems that have had major problems with in-
ternational terrorism-United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Germany
and Italy-reveals that the CTC is gathering valuable information regard-
ing the legislative, executive and judicial steps these countries are taking
to combat international terrorism. One of the questions that member
states have been asked to respond to is: "[w]hat steps have been taken to
establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offenses and to ensure that the
punishment reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts? Please supply
102. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 100, 3, (a)-(g).
103. Id. 6.
104. Id. 8.
105. United Nations Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, Chairman of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), Address at the Symposium, Combating Inter-
national Terrorism: The Contribution of the United Nations (Vienna, June 3-4 2002),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/viennaNotes.htm.
106. See Press Release, Security Council Presidential Statement Invites
Counter-Terrorism Committee (July 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/ docs/2004/sc8152.doc.htm. The press release summarizes a briefing
to the Security Council by Alexander Konuzin of the Russian Federation on the
work program of the committee. Id.
107. Id.
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examples of any convictions obtained and the sentence given." 10 8 The
examples of convictions and sentences supplied in these reports, however,
are either non-existent or very brief. The United States' reports appear to
be the most forthcoming in this respect, but even this information is
skimpy, giving no information on how their law enforcement officials
came to have custody of the accused.109
There is some hope this situation will improve in the future. Al-
though the Security Council created the CTC through its adoption of Res-
olution 1373, it left it to the committee to decide on its operating
procedures. 110 Because of the broad scope of Resolution 1373, the com-
mittee decided to proceed with its assessments of member states' obliga-
tion to carry out the resolution in three stages. As explained by Eric
Rosand:
For the first, Stage A, the CTC agreed that states should have
legislation in place covering all aspects of the resolution and
should begin the process of becoming party to the twelve interna-
tional terrorism conventions and protocols as soon as possible.
In addition, the CTC agreed that states should establish effective
executive machinery for preventing and suppressing terrorist fi-
nancing. The CTC's review of the second set of reports, contin-
108. See Guidance for the Submission of Reports Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security
Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, U.N. SCOR S.C. Comm., availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/guide.htm (last visited Mar.
14, 2005).
109. The first U.S. report noted that the United States had prosecuted cases
under U.S. laws implementing the Montreal Convention (Aircraft Sabotage), the
Hague Convention (Aircraft Hijacking), the Hostages Convention and the Interna-
tionally Protected Persons Convention and giving, by way of footnotes, citations to
cases involving the crimes covered by these conventions. See Letter from the Chair-
man of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373
(2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR Counter-Terrorism Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/
2001/1220 (2001). The information regarding U.S. prosecutions appears on page
22. The second U.S. report contains no information regarding prosecutions or
convictions of terrorists. See Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-
Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR
Counter-Terrorism Comm., 58th Sess., Annex, S/2002/674 (June 17, 2002). For
its part, the third U.S. report informs the committee that "[iour terrorist cells in
Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle, and Portland (Oregon) have been broken up; 300 indi-
viduals have been criminally charged in the United States in terrorism investiga-
tions; 163 individuals have been convicted or have pled guilty in the United States,
including shoe-bomber Richard Reid and 'American Taliban'John Walker Lindh."
See Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pur-
suant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR Counter-Terrorism Comm., 60th
Sess. Annex, S/2004/296 (Apr. 15, 2004).
110. See Eric Rosand, Current Development: Security Council Resolution 1373, the
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333
(2003).
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ued though early 2003, monitors all states regarding these two
priorities. Reviews of third and subsequent reports will probably
continue to focus on Stage A until the CTC experts are satisfied
that adequate legislation covering all aspects of Resolution 1373
is in place. The CTC then will begin to focus on the Stage B
priorities that the CTC also agreed to in July, namely: (1) having
executive machinery in place covering all aspects of Resolution
1373, (2) having an effective government-wide coordination
mechanism for counterterrorism activity, and (3) cooperating on
bilateral, regional, and international levels, including exchange
of information. Looking further ahead, the CTC envisions that
in Stage C it will focus on the implementation of the above legis-
lation and executive machinery to bring terrorists and their sup-
porters to justice. I 11
The Security Council may have taken a step toward Stage C in adopt-
ing Resolution 1535.112 By this resolution, adopted on March 26, 2004,
the Council restructured the CTC. Under its new structure, the CTC con-
sists of a Plenary-composed of the Security Council's member states-
and a Bureau, composed of a Chair and Vice-Chairs that are assisted by a
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). The CTED
was established as a special political mission under the policy guidance of
the Plenary for an initial period ending in December 2007 and subject to a
comprehensive review by the Security Council by December 31, 2005.113
On June 29, 2004, Ambassador Javier Ruperez of Spain became Executive
Director of CTED. Ambassador Ruperez announced that the newly revital-
ized CTC was beginning preparations for its first on-site visit to a member
state with the state's permission. 11
4
John Danforth, United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, reportedly stressed that it was essential for the success of
the CTED to move beyond the focus on written reports and to gather
enough information to determine which states "had gone beyond just
signing treaties and approving resolutions." 1 5 The creation of CTED will
give the CTC a more professional and expert staff, which will begin to
111. Id. at 335-36. For an updated and expanded version of Rosand's report,
see Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee:
The Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism, in LE-
GAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE
603 (Fijaut & Woters eds., 2004).
112. S.C. Res. 1535, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 4936th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1535 (2004).
113. Id. (outlining review provision of Counter-Terrorism Committee Execu-
tive Directorate (CTED)).
114. See Press Release, Security Council Presidential Statement Invites
Counter-Terrorism Committee to Accelerate Work on Assessing Assistance Needs
of Member States (July 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2004/sc8152.doc.htm.
115. See id. at 4-5 (providing summary of Ambassador Danforth's remarks).
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travel to countries, with experts from other organizations, to start assessing
on the ground implementation of Resolution 1373. An important part of
this assessment should be whether states are prosecuting, extraditing or
harboring terrorists or terrorist groups. Such an assessment will be com-
plicated, however, by the failure of CTC and CTED to adopt an agreed
definition of terrorism. In the absence of an agreed definition, each state
can decide for itself who is a terrorist. Accordingly, the CTC is likely to
confront situations where a state is failing to prosecute individuals that
some CTC members believe are terrorists, but the state concerned does
not.' 16 There has been some discussion in the CTC of asking each state to
submit a list of successful terrorist prosecutions and then compiling and
maintaining a global, public list. There may be some resistance to this
proposal because it might draw more attention to those states not on the
list, contrary to the non-confrontational approach that has historically
characterized CTC's proceedings.1 1 7
IV. COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THROUGH CIVIL LITIGATION
One of the highlights of the October 23rd symposium was the panel
on combating the financing of international crime, and we are fortunate
to have three excellent articles on that topic in these proceedings. 11 8 The
first part of this section of my Article seeks to supplement these articles
with a brief overview of a recent development: the use of civil suits in the
U.S. courts to counter the financing of terrorists and terrorist organiza-
tions.1 19 The second part does the same with respect to civil suits brought
against state sponsors of terrorism.1 20 Before turning to examples of these
kinds of suits, however, we should consider both the advantages and draw-
backs of civil suits against terrorists, terrorist organizations and state spon-
sors of terrorism. 121 At first blush, it would appear that civil suits against
terrorists would be a "second best" option to criminal prosecution. But it
is not clear that this is necessarily so. Depending on the circumstances,
the prospects for holding the perpetrators of international terrorism civilly
liable for their actions may be greater than the prospects for holding them
criminally liable. Plaintiffs in civil suits benefit from the standard of proof
in civil suits-preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt-and are able to use discovery devices and, in some in-
116. For this observation, I am indebted to Eric Rosand, Deputy Legal Coun-
selor, United States Mission to the United Nations in New York.
117. Again, I am indebted to Eric Rosand for this observation.
118. See Morais, supra note 23; Smallwood, supra note 23; Zagaris, supra note
23.
119. See generally CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM (John Norton Moore
ed., 2004) (discussing more extensive treatment of this subject).
120. My overview of both topics draws heavily on and is an updating of John
F. Murphy, Civil Lawsuits as a Legal Response to International Terrorism, in CrVIL LITI-
GATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 119, at 37.
121. For more extensive exploration of these advantages and drawbacks, see
id. at 43-46.
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stances, conventions on discovery to obtain documents and other forms of
evidence unavailable in criminal proceedings.1 22
Moreover, as noted by Professor Jose E. Alvarez, civil suits may be
more effective than criminal proceedings in establishing the full factual
context in which the perpetrators committed their crimes, thereby en-
hancing the prospects that the victims will have their suffering brought to
the attention of the wider community and that a definitive, historically
accurate account of the atrocities will be provided.' 23 Also, unlike crimi-
nal trials, civil suits provide at least the possibility that victims may be com-
pensated for lost property, for injuries suffered or for emotional distress
caused.12 4
To be sure, civil litigation in the United States as an alternative to
criminal prosecution for the commission of international crimes or egre-
gious human rights violations is a highly controversial subject.' 2 5 Subject-
ing foreign governments to such suits has been, if anything, even more
controversial. Moreover, as we shall see below, the barriers to successful
litigation in this area are formidable and include, inter alia, resistance by
the United States government, limits on the lifting of the immunity of
foreign states under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), diffi-
culties in collecting judgments in the United States and, especially, possi-
ble hostile and retaliatory reaction on the part of foreign governments.
A. Civil Suits Against Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations
Although there are a number of possible bases of subject matter juris-
diction in United States law that might permit civil suits against terrorists
122. The primary relevant convention is The Hague Convention on the Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature March
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1972).
123. SeeJose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 2031, 2101 (1998).
124. Professor Alvarez further points out:
For these reasons, civil suits, controlled by plaintiff/victims and their cho-
sen attorneys, and not prosecutors responsive to other agendas, may also
be more effective in preserving a collective memory that is more sensitive
to victims than some judicial accounts rendered in the course of criminal
trials. Indeed, if studies about litigants' relative satisfactions with adver-
sarial versus inquisitorial methods of criminal procedure are an accurate
guide, it may be that having greater control of the process, including the
selection of attorneys and the ability to discover and present one's own
evidence and develop one's own strategy, is itself a value for victims, and
one that is better met through civil suits such as those now occurring in
United States courts.
Id. at 2102.
125. See generally Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66
FoRDH-Am L. REv. 319 (1997); and John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission
of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARv. HUM. RTs. J.
1 (1999).
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and terrorist organizations,1 26 the most significant basis is the Antiterror-
ism Act (ATA).127 The ATA authorizes a U.S. national "injured in his or
her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international ter-
rorism" to sue for treble damages, including attorney's fees. 128 To recover
under this provision, plaintiffs have to demonstrate that they have been
injured by an act of international terrorism as defined under the federal
criminal code.129 Nevertheless, plaintiffs' burden of proof may be consid-
erably reduced by other provisions of the ATA. For example, a final judg-
ment or decree in favor of the United States in criminal proceedings
under various provisions of the criminal code covering crimes commonly
resorted to by terrorists "shall estop the defendant from denying the essen-
tial allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
under this section."' 30 A defendant may be similarly estopped by a final
judgment or decree rendered in favor of any foreign state "to the extent
that any such judgment or decree may be accorded full faith and credit
under the law of the United States .... 131
The sponsors of the ATA wished to ensure that victims of terrorism
were not left without a remedy, especially if, for evidentiary or other rea-
sons, criminal charges could not or would not be brought.132 They also
wished to make it unprofitable to engage in terrorist activities and to pre-
vent terrorists from soliciting and maintaining assets within the United
126. For a listing and discussion of these various bases, see Murphy, supra
note 120, at 47-65.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2004).
128. Id. § 2333(a).
129. Id. § 2331 (1). Under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), "international tern
rorism" means activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of
the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, as-
sassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators oper-
ate or seek asylum.
Id. § 2331 (1).
130. Id. § 2333(b).
131. Id. § 2333(c).
132. See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing In-
ternational Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 726,
737 n.36 (1991-92).
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States. To this end they sought to enhance the power of private citizens to
combat acts of terrorism.
13
-
3
Congress, however, placed a number of limitations on this power of
private citizens. First, it required that a plaintiff be a United States na-
tional, except in the case of "indirect victims" such as survivors and
heirs.' 3 4 Second, the cause of action is subject to a four year statute of
limitations, although this is tolled during the time a defendant is absent
from the United States or has concealed his whereabouts.' 35 Third, no
suits may be maintained against "a foreign state, an agency of a foreign
state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof
acting within his or her official capacity or under color of legal author-
ity."1 3 6 Fourth, no action may be brought for injury or loss by reason of an
act of war. 13 7 Finally, there are limitations on discovery of the investigative
files of the Department ofJustice if the Assistant Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General or Attorney General objects that such discovery will in-
terfere with a criminal investigation of the incident or a national security
operation related to the incident. 138 Similarly, the Attorney General may
intervene in any action brought under the ATA for the purpose of seeking
a stay on the ground that continuation of the civil action will substantially
interfere with a criminal prosecution that involves the same subject matter
in which an indictment has been returned, or interfere with national se-
curity operations related to the terrorist incident that is the subject of the
civil action. 139
At this writing, twenty-five cases have arisen under the ATA. 140 Many
of them illustrate the substantial barriers to a successful suit against ter-
rorists or terrorist organizations. Perhaps the most salient of these cases is
Smith ex rel, Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.1 41 There, various survi-
vors of the September l1th attacks sued the Taliban, Afghanistan and
Osama bin Laden under the ATA. They later added Saddam Hussein and
Iraq to the suit. As an initial matter, the court had to determine whether it
had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Plaintiffs effected service
on the Taliban and Afghanistan through personal service on Afghanistan's
Ambassador Abdul Salaam Zaeef and on the other defendants through
service by publication in Afghani and Pakistani newspapers and several
television stations. The court determined that this service met "minimal
due process" requirements. 14 2 When the court granted plaintiffs permis-
133. Id. at 741-42.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
135. Id. § 2335.
136. Id. § 2337(2).
137. Id. § 2336(a).
138. Id. § 2336(b).
139. Id. § 2336(c).
140. See id. § 2333.
141. 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
142. Id. at 220.
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sion to add Saddam Hussein and Iraq as defendants, the summons and
complaint were served upon Iraq via the United States Department of
State's Director of Special Consular Services, who in turn transmitted the
documents to Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. None of the defendants
appeared before the court.
In determining liability, the court proceeded seriatim to consider the
position of the various defendants. Turning first to the Al Qaeda defend-
ants, the court had to decide whether the attacks of September l1th fell
within the ATA's definition of "international terrorism," since the statute
defines international terrorism in contradistinction to "domestic terror-
ism." 1 4 3 While noting that the attacks of September 11th clearly "oc-
curred primarily" in the United States, the court focused on the part of
the definition that included acts that "transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished . . . or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate" or through the foreign nationality of the
perpetrators and their receipt of orders, funding and some training from
abroad. Based on these factors the court concluded that the acts of Sep-
tember 11th fell within the statute's definition of international terrorism
and the plaintiffs had pled a valid cause of action against the Al Qaeda
defendants.
Turning next to the plaintiffs' suits against Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
the court rejected their contention that they had a cause of action under
the ATA. Although the Act creates a cause of action for the "estate, survi-
vors, or heirs" of any U.S. national killed by an act of international terror-
ism, 144 the court noted that 18 U.S.C. Section 2337 appears expressly to
foreclose an action against Iraq and its leader. Under this provision of the
ATA, "[nlo action shall be maintained under Section 2333 of this title
against ... a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer or
employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or her
official capacity or under color of legal authority." The court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that amendments to FSIA permitting civil suits against
state sponsors of terrorism under certain circumstances had effectively
overridden the limitations of the ATA. In the court's view, these amend-
143. For the definition of "international terrorism" under the federal crimi-
nal code, see supra note 129. The definition of "domestic terrorism" covers activi-
ties that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the crimi-
nal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, as-
sassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
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ments to the FSIA were irrelevant to the issue whether the ATA permitted
a suit against Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
145
The court also held that plaintiffs had no cause of action against Sad-
dam Hussein under FSIA. In doing so, the court engaged in a two-step
process. First, it noted that FSIA withdraws sovereign immunity and grants
federal courts personal jurisdiction over a foreign state in certain enumer-
ated circumstances.1 4 6 Second, it referred to an amendment to FSIA enti-
tled "Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism," the so-called
"Flatow Amendment,"' 47 which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] n offi-
cial, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his or her office, employ-
ment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national.., for personal
injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which
the court of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under Section
1605(a) (7). "148 Although the language of this provision would prima fa-
cie appear to support a possible cause of action against Saddam Hussein,
the court observed that Congress has placed a significant limitation on this
cause of action: "No action shall be maintained under this action if an
official, employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be liable for
such acts if carried out within the United States."' 49 Applying this limita-
145. In the words of the court:
Plaintiff misses the point. The issue is not whether 2337 bars suit against
Iraq and Saddam Hussein under FSIA Section 1605(a)(7)-it certainly
does not-but whether plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 2333,
which permits treble damages for civil violations of the ATA. Section
2337 could not be clearer: it prevents suits under § 2333 against foreign
states and officers wherein a plaintiff who prevails would be entitled to
treble damages.
Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
146. Specifically, the court referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7), which pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case-. . . in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, air-
craft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources ... for such an act if such an act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee or agent of such for-
eign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employ-
ment, or agency ....
Id.
147. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 309-172 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605). This bill is commonly referred to as the "Flatow Amendment,"
after the father whose daughter fell victim to a terrorist suicide bombing on an
Israeli bus on which she was a passenger for which Iran was responsible. See Flatow
v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2004).
149. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 228. The Smith court quoted Price v. Socialist
People's Libyan ArabJamahiiya for the reasons behind this limitation, stating that
"[e]xecutive branch officials feared that the proposed amendment [the Flatow
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tion to the plaintiffs' action against Saddam Hussein, the court found that
"[t]he Supreme Court has held that a claim against a U.S. president for
the conduct identical to that alleged against Saddam Hussein would be
barred because of the president's absolute immunity from damages for
conduct associated with the exercise of his official duties.,5 0 The court
then dismissed the claim against Saddam Hussein.
The court also struggled with the plaintiffs' claim against Iraq. The
court first observed that the Flatow Amendment "provides a cause of ac-
tion against a foreign state's officials, employees and agents, but does not
expressly provide a cause of action against the foreign state itself." 1 5
Nonetheless, the court noted further that "[t]he majority view permits a
cause of action against a foreign state, despite the lack of clarity in the
statute."1 5 2 Similarly, while conceding that the matter was "not free from
doubt," the court concluded that "the better view ... is that the Flatow
Amendment likely provides a cause of action against a foreign state." 15 3
Having decided that the Flatow Amendment provides a cause of action
against a foreign state, the court next noted that plaintiffs had to prove the
existence of five elements to recover damages in their suit against Iraq.1 5 4
First, that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture, extraju-
dicial killing, aircraft sabotage or hostage taking. Second, the act was ei-
ther perpetrated by the foreign state directly or by a non-state actor which
receives material support or resources from the foreign state defendant.
Third, the act or the provision of material support or resources is engaged
in by an agent, official or employee of the foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, agency or employment. Fourth, the foreign
state must be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism either at the time
Amendment] to FSIA might cause other nations to respond in kind, thus poten-
tially subjecting the American government to suits in foreign countries for actions
taken in the United States." Id. (quoting Price, 294 F.3d 82, 88-89 (D.C. Cir.
2002)).
150. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
151. Id. at 227.
152. Id. The cases cited by the court as supporting the majority view, in foot-
note 14, include: Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231
(D.D.C. 2002) ("IT]he Flatow Amendment does provide victims with a cause of
action against the culpable foreign state."); Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231
F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2002) (allowing, without discussion, case against Iran
under 18 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7)); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19
(D.D.C. 2001) (allowing suit against Iraq based on statute's withdrawal of sover-
eign immunity for sponsorship of terrorism); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124
F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that Flatow Amendment creates
cause of action against foreign state ); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173, Civ. A. No. 99-377, 2000 WL 333574311 (D.D.C. 2000)
(allowing, with little discussion, case against Iran under § 1605 (a) (7)); Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (allowing suit against
Iran based on statute's withdrawal of sovereign immunity for sponsorship of
terrorism).
153. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
154. Id. at 226.
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the incident complained of occurred or was later so designated as a result
of such act. Fifth, either the plaintiff or the victim was a U.S. national at
the time of the incident. Applying these elements to the case before it, the
court concluded that several of them required little discussion: "There can
be no doubt that [plaintiffs'] deaths resulted from aircraft sabotage, and,
seemingly, hostage taking and extrajudicial killing as well (first element);
that both victims were U.S. nationals at the time of the incident (fifth ele-
ment) . . . and that since 1990 the United States has designated Iraq as a
state-sponsor of terrorism (fourth element)."' 5 5
The court found, however, that:
The other two elements-I) that the act was either perpetrated
by the foreign state directly or by a non-state actor which receives
material support or resources from the foreign state defendant
and 2) the act or the provision of material support or resources is
engaged in by an agent, official or employee of the foreign state
while acting within the scope of his or her office, agency or em-
ployment-require closer consideration.1 5 6
Specifically, plaintiffs' theory required that they prove "Iraqi agents pro-
vided material support to bin Laden and Al Qaeda in the form of training,
providing safehouses, and document forgery." 157
To meet their burden of proof, plaintiffs relied primarily on the testi-
mony of two expert witnesses: Robert James Woolsey, Jr., the Director of
Central Intelligence from February 1993 to January 1995, and Dr. Laurie
Mylroie, an expert on Iraq and its involvement in terrorism generally and
the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 in particular. Dr. Mylroie
described Iraq's covert involvement in acts of terrorism against the United
States in the past, including the bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993. For his part, Director Woolsey reviewed several facts that tended in
his view to show Iraq's involvement in acts of terrorism against the United
States in general and in the events of September l1th in particular.1 58
Primarily on the basis of this testimony, the court concluded that:
[P]laintiffs have shown, albeit it barely, 'by evidence satisfactory
to the court' that Iraq provided material support to Bin Laden
and al Qaeda. As noted above, a very substantial portion of plain-
tiffs [sic] evidence is classically hearsay (and often multiple hear-
say), and without meeting any exceptions is inadmissible for
substantive purposes. Thus the hearsay rule prevents the Court
from considering as substantive evidence: the Ambassador of the
Czech Republic's letter which repeats Minister Gross's statement
155. Id. at 228.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. For the court's summary of Dr. Myroie's and Director Woolsey's testi-
mony, see id. at 228-32.
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about a meeting between Atta [one of the September 11 th hijack-
ers] and al Ani [a high level Iraqi intelligence agent] in Prague,
the contacts described in CIA Director Tenet's letter to Sen. Gra-
ham, the evidence that Secretary Powell recited in his remarks
before the U.N., and the defectors' descriptions about the use of
Salman Pak [a highly secure military facility in Iraq] as a camp to
train Islamic fundamentalists in terrorist [sic]. However, the
opinion testimony of the plaintiffs' experts is sufficient to meet
plaintiffs' burden that Iraq collaborated in or supported bin
Laden/al Qaeda's terrorist acts of September 11. Although these
experts provided few actual facts of any material support that
Iraq actually provided, their opinions, coupled with their qualifi-
cations as experts on this issue, provide a sufficient basis for a
reasonable jury to draw inferences which could lead to the con-
clusion that Iraq provided material support to al Qaeda and that
it did so with knowledge and intent to further al Qaeda's crimi-
nal acts.159
It is worth noting that the court's conclusion is contrary to the claims
of critics of the Bush Administration who are of the view that no meaning-
ful connection between Iraq and the attacks on September l1th has been
established. 160
Be that as it may, the court awarded the plaintiffs substantial damages
against Iraq for economic loss, pain and suffering and loss of solatium, as
well as treble damages against the "al Qaeda defendants" under the
ATA.1 6 But collecting on these damage awards has proven so far to be a
mission impossible. For example, after receiving their judgment against
Iraq, the September 11th plaintiffs sought to satisfy it by attaching certain
Iraqi assets that were held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. But
they were blocked in this endeavor by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, which issued a summary judgment in
favor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and John W. Snow, Secre-
tary of the Treasury, defendants in the case. 1 62 The District Court's judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.163
In bringing their action, the plaintiffs relied on Section 201 of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), 16 4 which states in pertinent
part that "in every case in which a person has obtained ajudgment against
159. Id. at 232.
160. See, e.g., CBS News.com, 9/11 Panel: No Qaeda-Iraq Link (June 16, 2004),
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/16/terror/main623504.shtmi.
161. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 232-41.
162. See Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 280 F. Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (Smith II).
163. Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 346 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003).
164. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116
Stat. 2322.
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a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism... the blocked
assets of that terrorist party... shall be subject to execution... in order to
satisfy such judgment."165 Defendants, however, pointed out that, prior to
the entry of plaintiffs' judgment,166 on March 20, 2003, President George
W. Bush had issued an Executive Order confiscating all frozen Iraqi assets
held by the government and vesting tide to those assets in the United
States Department of the Treasury.167 Defendants further noted that Sec-
tion 1503 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2003 (EWSAA) 1 6 8 gave the President the authority to "make inapplicable
with respect to Iraq" any law "that applies to countries that have supported
terrorism." 169 According to defendants, the President had exercised this
authority and made TRIA inapplicable to Iraq, thereby blocking plaintiffs'
right to execute against the funds.
1 70
The Second Circuit agreed with defendants' argument that the Presi-
dent's order confiscating all frozen Iraqi assets and vesting title to those
assets in the Treasury Department barred the plaintiffs from collecting on
their judgment against Iraq. Because the court concluded this resolved
the appeal, it decided there was no need to consider the defendants' con-
tentions regarding the authority of the President to make TRIA inapplica-
ble to Iraq under EWSAA.17 1 As for the judgments against the Al Qaeda
defendants, any assets of Al Qaeda found in the United States have been
frozen by presidential order 72 and are therefore under the control of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). At this writing, reportedly law-
yers for the plaintiffs are in discussions with OFAC about making the fro-
zen assets available for execution of the judgments. If these discussions
are not successful, legal action to recover from these funds is a distinct
possibility.1
73
165. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 2337.
166. The court entered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs on July 14, 2003.
See Smith, 346 F.3d at 266.
167. See Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003). The
President was acting pursuant to the authority granted him by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as
amended 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707).
168. Supplemental Appropriations-FY 2003, Pub. L. No. 109-11, 117 Stat.
559.
169. Id. § 1503, 117 Stat. at 579.
170. See Presidential Determination No. 2003-23, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,259 (May 7,
2003); see also Message to the Congress Reporting the Declaration of a National
Emergency with Respect to the Development Fund for Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 647 (May 22, 2003) (specifically referencing TRIA Section 201 as
among laws made inapplicable by the May 7 Executive Order).
171. For discussion of the Second Circuit's reasoning, see Smith, 346 F.3d at
269-72.
172. See Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
173. I am indebted to James E. Beasley, Jr., attorney for the plaintiffs, for this
information.
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The record of success for other plaintiffs bringing suits under the
ATA is decidedly mixed. In Knox v. Palestine Liberation Organization,
174
plaintiffs were the representative and heirs and survivors of the estate of
Aharon Ellis. They alleged that on the night of January 17, 2002, Ellis, an
American citizen then thirty-one years old, was performing as a singer at a
Bat Mitzvah held in the David's Palace banquet hall in Hadera, Israel. At
10:45 p.m., a gunman burst through the door of the banquet hall and,
using a machine gun, opened fire into the crowd of celebrants, killing six
people, including Ellis, and wounding over thirty. Plaintiffs alleged further
that the gunman and other individually named and unnamed defendants
were employees, agents or co-conspirators of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) and the Palestine Authority (PA) and, as such, planned
and carried out the attack acting in concert with or under instructions or
inducements or with the assistance or material support and resources pro-
vided by the PLO, the PA, Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO and leader
of the PA and the other individual defendants. Defendants moved to dis-
miss the complaint, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction and non-
justiciability. The court denied the defendants' motion.
In the court's view neither the PLO nor the PA was a "state" within
the meaning of the FSIA. Assuming arguendo that a sovereign state of
Palestine existed, the United States had not recognized it, and therefore it
was not entitled to immunity under FSIA. Lastly, the court held the politi-
cal question doctrine did not bar plaintiffs' action for damages under the
ATA, because the court would simply adjudicate whether and to what ex-
tent plaintiffs could recover against defendants for the murder of an
American citizen in a terrorist attack in Israel and would not have to an-
swer broader and intractable political questions that formed the backdrop
to the suit. 1
75
By contrast, in Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Development Corp.,176
victims and representatives of victims of the terrorist attacks of September
llth brought suit against the director of Saudi Arabia's Department of
General Intelligence and Saudi Arabia's third-highest ranking government
official for allegedly funding and supporting the Al Qaeda terrorist organi-
174. 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
175. For a decision similar to Knox, see Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Govern-
ment Authority, 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004). There, plaintiffs, an American
woman whose husband was killed in the bombing of a school bus in the Gaza Strip
and another American woman who was wounded on the bus, brought an action
under ATA and various tort theories against the Palestinian Interim Self-Govern-
ment Authority (PA), the PLO and various named and unnamed individuals. De-
fendants moved to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over them and subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action. The District
Court held that: (1) it lacked personal jurisdiction over the named individual de-
fendants; (2) it could exercise personal jurisdiction over the PA; (3) the PA was
not a sovereign state entitled to immunity; (4) the complaint sufficiently stated a
claim under the ATA; (5) the court had supplemental jurisdiction over tort claims;
and (6) the action did not present a nonjusticiable controversy.
176. 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003).
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zation that carried out the attacks. The District Court for the District of
Columbia held that: (1) the Director was entitled to foreign sovereign
immunity because the alleged acts were taken within the scope of his offi-
cial duties; (2) the state-sponsored terrorism exception of FSIA was inap-
plicable because Saudi Arabia was not on the Department of State's list of
state sponsors of terrorism; (3) the official's alleged conduct did not qual-
ify as "commercial" within the commercial activity exception to the FSIA;
(4) the plaintiffs did not allege a causal connection sufficient to invoke the
non-commercial tort exception of the FSIA, because "plaintiffs' allegations
that (i) [the individual defendants] funded (ii) those who funded (iii)
those who carried out the September 11 th attacks would stretch the causa-
tion requirement of the noncommercial tort exception not only to 'the
farthest reaches of the common law,' but perhaps beyond, to terra incog-
nita;" 1 77 (5) plaintiffs had alleged insufficient minimum contacts with the
United States to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the gov-
ernment official.
1 78
In Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,179 on September 19,
1989, a DC-10 airliner operated by the French airline Union de Transports
Aeriens (UTA) as UTA Flight 772, departed Brazzaville, Congo, with 170
passengers en route to Paris. The passengers were from 17 countries, in-
cluding seven Americans. While flying over southeastern Niger, after a
stopover in N'Djamena, Chad, UTA Flight 772 exploded in mid-air killing
all aboard. The 37 plaintiffs in this action-all of them American citi-
zens-were the personal representatives of the estates of the seven Ameri-
cans who died aboard UTA Flight 772, or their kinsmen, and the
American corporate owner-lessor of the aircraft. Drawing upon the results
of an extensive investigation by French authorities into the circumstances
177. Id. at 20.
178. For a somewhat bizarre case, see George v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 63 Fed.
Appx. 917 (7th Cir. 2003). There, plaintiffs, all prison inmates in Wisconsin,
brought an action against over fifty defendants-including Iran, Syria, Iraq, the
Sudan, Libya, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, several known or suspected terrorists then in
U.S. custody and a number of banks and relief organizations suspected of funnel-
ing funds to terrorist organizations-in response to the events of September 1 th
and sought millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Before any
of the defendants filed an answer, the district court sua sponte dismissed the case
for want of subject matter jurisdiction based on lack of standing, and denied a
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the Seventh Circuit recognized that dis-
trict courts are generally discouraged from sua sponte dismissing a complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction without first providing the plaintiff notice and a
hearing or an opportunity to amend, such dismissal is appropriate if the defect is
incurable. In this case the defect was incurable because the plaintiffs had never
been victims of terrorist acts and were no more likely than the average American
citizen to be victims of future attacks. Thus, the "injury" they alleged was purely
speculative. An interest that the plaintiffs held in common with society at large was
too abstract to constitute an injury in fact and thus was insufficient to confer
standing.
179. 290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003).
37
Murphy: Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crim
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of UTA Flight 772's destruction, and judicial proceedings, both civil and
criminal, in France, that allegedly determined the explosion to have re-
sulted from an act of terrorism committed by officials and agents of the
Libyan government, the American individual plaintiffs sued Libya, its in-
telligence service (the Libyan External Security Organization (LESO))
and seven individuals (including the Libyan head of state Muammar
Qadhafi) for money damages for extrajudicial killings, aircraft sabotage
and personal injuries. Jurisdiction was predicated upon FISA and the
Flatow Amendment thereto. For its part, the corporate plaintiff based its
cause of action on the conventional tort claims of conversion and tortious
interference, and a statutory claim based on the ATA.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on five consolidated juris-
dictional grounds. They contended that the court was without personal
jurisdiction over the individual defendants; that it lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over Libya on due process grounds under the U.S. Constitution; and
that it had no subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA to hear the cor-
porate plaintiffs' claims. They also asserted that FSIA and the Flatow
Amendment do not create a private cause of action and that the case
should be dismissed because the United States, and in particular the Dis-
trict of Columbia, was an inconvenient forum.
The court relied on a previous decision of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit 180 to reject defendants' argument that the
court could not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Libya
on the ground that "foreign states are not 'persons' protected by the Fifth
Amendment" and "the Fifth Amendment poses no obstacle to the decision
of the United States Government to subject Libya to personal jurisdiction
in the federal courts." 18 1 The court decided to go along with "the deci-
sions of its district court colleagues here and elsewhere construing Section
1605 (a) (7) and the Flatow Amendment as providing a private cause of
action for American citizens against foreign states for harm done to them
by state-sponsored acts of terrorism" and therefore rejected the defend-
ants' argument to the contrary.182 The court also quickly dismissed de-
fendants' argument that the case should be dismissed because the District
of Columbia was an inconvenient forum in comparison to France, where
much of the evidence and many of the witnesses were to be found, on the
ground that France had not waived the sovereign immunity of Libya and
plaintiffs therefore would not be able to bring their claims against Libya in
that country. 183
180. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 294 F. 3d 82 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
181. Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
182. Id. at 57 (citing Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S.Ct. 2836 (2004)). The court noted, however,
that the D. C. Circuit still regards the issue as unresolved. Id.
183. See id. at 57.
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The court gave somewhat closer scrutiny to other claims asserted by
defendants. First, they submitted that the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the individual defendants in their personal capacities. The court
recognized that, unlike the government of Libya, individual defendants
acting in their personal capacities were entitled to the due process protec-
tions of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In applying the
"minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,18 4 the
court stated that "the single most important consideration is whether a
defendant's 'conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should anticipate being haled into court there." 1 8 5 Applying this test
to the facts of the case, the court concluded "[a]s the plane they chose to
destroy was on an international flight and expected to stop in several na-
tions before reaching its final destination, the individual defendants could
and should have reasonably postulated that passengers of many nationali-
ties would be on board, from which they could also expect they might be
haled into the courts of those nations whose citizens would die."1 8 6 The
court also pointed out that it was foreseeable that some Americans would
be aboard the plane and that the "interest of the United States in prevent-
ing and punishing international terrorism has been a matter of worldwide
knowledge for years."18 7 Hence, the court concluded, "defendants should
have anticipated the possibility of being 'haled into court' in the United
States in some capacity ... [and the court] may constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants in their personal ca-
pacities without offending any 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' "188
Turning to the claims of the corporate plaintiff who owned the air-
plane that was destroyed in the bombing of UTA Flight 772, the court
noted that the plaintiff asserted the conventional tort claims of conversion
and tortious interference, and a claim under the ATA. The court quickly
concluded that the ATA barred plaintiff's claim against Libya, its intelli-
gence agency LESO, and the individual defendants acting in their official
capacities.18 9 But since the court had already found that it had personal
jurisdiction over the individual defendants in their personal, as well as
their official capacities, the corporate plaintiff could assert its conversion
184. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
185. Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 60 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
189. Id. at 60-61. The court pointed out that jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2), which states:
No action shall be maintained under section 2333 of the title [18 U.S.C.]
against... (2) a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer
or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or
her official capacity or under color of legal authority.
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and tortious interference claims against the individual defendants in their
personal capacities. The ATA provides a cause of action not only against
the terrorists themselves, but also against persons, both natural and legal,
who have provided financial and other resources to a terrorist organiza-
tion. Because of this, the Act has been subject to constitutional challenge.
The leading case on this issue is Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,19 0 where
the parents of a terrorist victim killed by the terrorist organization Hamas
in Israel brought a lawsuit against two not-for-profit corporations in the
United States that allegedly provided financial support to Hamas. Inter-
preting the ATA, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first ruled
that the mere funding of Hamas was not an activity that "involve [s] violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life" within the meaning of the Act. 19' In
the court's view, the ATA required the defendant at least have knowledge
that the moneys forwarded to Hamas would be used to support the ter-
rorists who murdered the plaintiffs' son. Mere funding of a terrorist or-
ganization, standing alone, was not an act of terrorism under the ATA.
But the court nonetheless held that the ATA may apply to the provision of
material resources to a terrorist organization because of two subsequent
amendments to the federal criminal laws on terrorism-18 U.S.C. Sections
2339A and 2339B. Section 2339A makes it a crime to knowingly provide
material support or resources to be used in preparation for or carrying out
terrorist acts. Section 2339B prohibits knowingly providing material sup-
port or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Although
Congress enacted these criminal prohibitions with no express reference to
civil liability, the court relied on these provisions as an alternative basis for
imposing civil liability under the ATA. It held that violations of Sections
2339A and 2339B gave rise to civil liability under Section 2333 so long as
knowledge and intent were also shown. 192 The court further held that
defendants could be held civilly liable for aiding and abetting an act of
terrorism, although the ATA did not explicitly provide for aiding and abet-
ting liability. It based this holding on the language, structure and legisla-
tive history of Section 2333. Lastly, the court rejected defendants'
arguments that its holdings were inconsistent with their First Amendment
rights.
Although it has been suggested that the "reasoning in Boim is not en-
tirely convincing," 19 3 and that "Congress could clarify the relationship be-
tween criminal statutes concerning the provision of resources to terrorists
190. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)(A) (2001).
192. Recently, court decisions have held that the Department of State's proce-
dures for designating certain groups as terrorist organizations violate the group's
due process rights under the Constitution. See, e.g., Nat'l Council of Resistance of
Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). At this writing it is unclear
what implications, if any, these decisions may have for the result and the reasoning
in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute.
193. See Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, US. Civil Litigation and Interna-
tional Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 119, at 122.
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and the ATA," 194 at this writing, this has not happened. Moreover, as to
the First Amendment issue, the Boim decision has been cited, and its analy-
sis followed, in at least two other opinions. 195 There have also been other
decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 2339B.196
In general, one may say that most of the cases brought under the ATA
have survived challenges posed by motions to dismiss on the basis of lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or alleged unconstitutionality of
the ATA's provisions and now plaintiffs will have to prove their factual
allegations. The major exception to this observation is Smith v. Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan,197 where the court awarded treble damages against
the Al Qaeda defendants under the ATA, but it is unclear whether they
will be able to collect against assets currently frozen by the U.S.
government.
One may also observe that U.S. courts have been willing to surmount
possible barriers to successful suits under the ATA. In Smith, for example,
the court interpreted the definition of "international terrorism" under the
ATA broadly enough to cover the attacks of September 11 th, even though
they took place and killed or injured their victims entirely within the
United States. 198 Similarly, the court in Knox v. Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation'99 held that the political question doctrine constituted no barrier to
an action for damages under the ATA. In Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamhiriya,200 the court rendered an expansive reading of the "mini-
mum contacts" necessary to meet the due process requirements for an
exercise of personal jurisdiction over individual alleged terrorists acting in
their personal capacities. The court's ruling in Pugh belies Jack Gold-
smith's and Ryan Goodman's suggestion that "[t]he due process clause,
which still has a powerful territorial orientation, probably does not permit
the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants for
acts of terrorism directed and committed abroad, even against U.S. citi-
zens."20 ' Lastly, in Boim and other cases, United States courts have so far
largely dismissed constitutional challenges to the ATA based on the First
194. Id. at 149.
195. Both opinions were issued in the context of criminal actions rather than
civil liability suits. See United States v. A1-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla.
2004); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
196. The most recent decision is the en banc decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.
2004). In Hammoud, the court declined to apply the narrowing construction ap-
plied by a Ninth Circuit panel in Humanitarian Law Project v. Dep't of Justice, 352
F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), which required a showing that the defendant knew either
of a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation as such or of its related illegal
activities. The Ninth Circuit decision will be reheard en banc.
197. 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
198. Id. at 236.
199. 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
200. 290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003).
201. See Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 193, at 117.
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Amendment, although at this writing there are cases to the contrary and
litigation on this issue continues. 20 2
Examining the cases discussed above, one may also conclude that
United States courts have been willing to award substantial damages to
plaintiffs bringing civil suits against states on the Department of State's list
of state sponsors of terrorism. 20 3 As the decision in Smith v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York20 4 demonstrates, however, these decisions may often
amount to no more than pyrrhic victories for successful plaintiffs. The
next section of this Article briefly explores some of the reasons for these
difficulties.
B. Civil Suits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism: Barriers to Enforcement
of Judgments
The basic problem plaintiffs' face in seeking to enforce United States
judgments against state sponsors of terrorism is twofold. First, there is no
prospect of enforcing such judgments abroad,20 5 and enforcement of
these judgments against the assets of state sponsors located in the United
States is subject to political vagaries, both in the United States and in the
international arena. The Smith case is a good example. Although the Sep-
tember 11 th plaintiffs in that case were able to cite specific federal legisla-
tion that permitted them to execute ajudgment against the blocked assets
of a state on the list of state sponsors of terrorism,20 6 they were unable to
do so because prior to the entry of the plaintiffs' judgment, President
Bush had issued an executive order confiscating all frozen Iraqi assets held
by the government and vesting title to those assets in the U.S. Department
of the Treasury.20 7 The reason for the President's action, of course, was
202. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
203. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382,
405 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting plaintiffs summary judgment and permanent injunc-
tion to extent that court finds prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 2339 of providing "train-
ing" and "personnel" to organizations designated as "Foreign Terrorist
Organizations" is unconstitutionally vague); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft,
309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (granting plaintiffs summary judg-
ment and permanent injunction to extent that court finds prohibition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339 of providing "expert advice or assistance" to organizations designated by
United States Secretary of State as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" is impermissi-
bly vague).
204. 346 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003). For another case in which plaintiffs were
awarded substantial damages against a state sponsor of terrorism, see Campuzano v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003). Based on a suicide
bombing in Jerusalem, Israel, damages for pain and suffering ranging from 7 to 15
million dollars were awarded to those present at the bombings against Iran; com-
pensatory damages of 2.5 million to 7 million were awarded to family members;
and Iranian government officials were held liable for punitive damages of 300 mil-
lion dollars. See id.
205. See Murphy, supra note 120, at 73-75, 104-05 (discussing difficulty of en-
forcing U.S. court decisions abroad).
206. TRIA of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337.
207. Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003).
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the need to have these assets available to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq
after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Hence, the interna-
tional development resulted in the plaintiffs being unable to rely on legis-
lation adopted by Congress with a view to aiding plaintiffs in the
September 1lth plaintiffs' position to enforce their judgments against the
assets of state sponsors of terrorism.
The Smith case is a recent example of a long-standing tension between
Congress and the executive branch over the disposition of the frozen as-
sets of states on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In addition to
amending FSIA to permit suits for money damages against state sponsors
of terrorism in 1996,208 Congress also amended FSIA to permit the attach-
ment of, or execution upon a judgment against, the property of a foreign
state used for a commercial activity in the United States. The action is
taken when the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is
not immune as a state sponsor of terrorism, "regardless of whether the
property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is based."
20 9
Normally, the property of a foreign state is immune from attachment if
the property was not involved with the act upon which the claim is
based.2 10
Despite this amendment to FSIA, plaintiffs in cases against Cuba and
Iran faced grave difficulties because Cuban and Iranian assets in the
United States were frozen and the executive branch was opposed to mak-
ing them available for the payment of judgments based on the foreign
states' support of terrorism.2 11 The plaintiffs in the successful cases
against Cuba and Iran first sought relief from the executive branch in the
form of an order to unblock the defendants' assets, but they were unsuc-
cessful.2 12 Turning next to Congress, they achieved what at first appeared
to be a pyrrhic victory.
208. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ADEPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (2004).
210. Id. § 1610(a).
211. The primary decisions, all awarding substantial damages against Cuba
and Iran, include: Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2000); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000);
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 1998); Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic of
Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). For a discussion of these cases, see W.
Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, 2001 Hugo Black Lecture: Illusion and Reality in
the Compensation of Victims of International Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561, 568-73
(2003).
212. SeeJohn F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes
as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARv. HUM. RTs.J. 1, 45 (1999). Michael
Reisman and Monica Hakimi have suggested that:
Although these five cases-Alejandre, Flatow, Cicipio, Anderson, and
Eisenfeld-produced unprecedented awards, they were, in a sense, empty
victories. The plaintiffs may have felt vindicated, but, if the defendant
states had assets in the United States, the executive did not allow enforce-
ment. The awards thus remained unenforced, and, it seemed, unenforce-
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Specifically, on October 21, 1998, the President signed into law Sec-
tion 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of
1999, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidate and Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Act of 1999.213 Section 117, inter alia, amends 28
U.S.C. Section 1610 to provide that "any property," including property fro-
zen under various provisions of the U.S. law, "shall be subject to execution
or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment relating to a claim for
which a foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality or such
state) claiming such property is not immune under section 1605
(a) (7). "1214 Under another provision of Section 117, however, the Presi-
dent "may waive the requirements of this section in the interests of na-
tional security."2 15 On October 21, 1998, the same day he signed the
legislation, President Clinton exercised this waiver authority on the
ground that application of the other provisions of Section 117 "would im-
pede the ability of the President to conduct foreign policy in the interest
of national security .... ,,216
In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
(VTVPA), 217 Congress took another tack. Under the VTVPA the United
States paid specific identified claimants compensatory, but not punitive,
damages awarded in terrorism exception suits against Cuba and Iran.
21 8
The President was able to block the attachment of diplomatic property
and the attachment of frozen assets of U.S. designated state sponsors of
terrorism, 219 but not attachment of proceeds from property used for any
non-diplomatic purpose or proceeds from any asset sold or transferred for
able. The new wave of international human rights suits in United States
courts seemed to have become exercises of judicial therapy for the fami-
lies of the victims, and, perhaps, for the courts that entered default judg-
ments in their favor. From an international legal standpoint, the
decisions had an eerie, autistic national character; their effects remained
largely within the United States and were never tested against interna-
tional law-because, from the standpoint of international law, in the ab-
sence of execution of judgment, nothing was happening.
Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 211, at 573.
213. Pub. L. No 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681491.
214. Id. §§ 117(a), 117(f)(1)(a) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610
(1998)).
215. Id. § 117(d) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (2) (B) (3)
(1998)).
216. See Exec. Order No. 99-1, 63 Fed Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998).
217. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA),
Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 154143 (codified as amended in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1610 (2003)).
218. Under the Act, claimants have three options: (1) they may obtain from
the Treasury Department 110 percent of the compensatory damages, plus interest,
if they relinquish all rights to compensatory and punitive damages awarded by a
U.S. court; (2) they may obtain 100 percent of compensatory damages, plus inter-
est, if they relinquish all rights to compensatory damages and all rights to execute
against or attach property; or (3) they may decline to obtain any payment from the
Treasury Department and continue to pursue their judgments. Id.
219. Exec. Order No. 201-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).
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value to a third party. 22 0 Under the VTVPA, Congress directed the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to pay a portion of the damages in one case against
Cuba and nine cases against Iran. 221 Reportedly, the United States gov-
ernment liquidated approximately half of Cuba's frozen assets to pay the
judgment against Cuba.2 22 By contrast, the Clinton Administration re-
fused to release any of Iran's frozen assets. As a result, the United States
Treasury paid the judgments out of general funds, on the understanding
that reimbursement from Iran would be sought at a later date. Doubts
have been raised as to whether reimbursement will be obtained, and the
Treasury's actions have been sharply criticized.
223
It is unclear at this writing what the effect of TRIA will be. As we have
seen, TRIA was of no assistance to the plaintiffs in Smith when President
Bush confiscated the frozen assets of Iraq and vested title to those assets in
the United States Department of the Treasury.2 24 On the other hand,
TRIA, unlike previous legislation, limits the President's waiver authority to
an asset-by-asset determination that a "waiver is necessary in the national
security interest .... -225 Moreover, the President can utilize his waiver
authority only to protect a few types of diplomatic property subject to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. 226 Courtjudgments can be executed against all other
types of blocked assets. 2 27 TRIA also specifies that certain judgments
against Iran are to be paid. 2
28
Whether TRIA will prove helpful to future plaintiffs trying to execute
judgments against the assets of state sponsors of terrorism remains to be
seen. Suits against Libya for its role in the destruction of Pan Am Flight
103229 have now been settled with Libya's acknowledgment of state re-
220. See H.R. REP. No. 106-733, at 5 (2000).
221. VTVPA, § 2002(b). The case against Cuba was Alejandre v. Republic of
Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). The cases against Iran were: Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Wagner v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001); Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No.
00-1798, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322 (D.D.C. 2001);Jenco v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151
F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107
(D.D.C. 2000); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:99CV00377, 2000 WL
33674311 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp.
2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
222. See Kelly A. Atherton, Compensating Victims Under The "Terrorism-Exception"
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A State-Sponsored Victim's Compensation Fund, 12
WILLAMEI'EJ. INT'L L. & Disp. REsOL. 158, 161-62 (2004).
223. See, e.g., Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 211, at 578-82.
224. Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 346 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003).
225. TRIA of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201 (b)(1), 116 Stat. 2322, 2337.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 201(a).
228. Id. §§ 201(c)-(d).
229. See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d
Cir. 1998).
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sponsibility and its offer to pay compensation to the families and heirs of
the victims. 230 There is, moreover, a serious debate over whether lawsuits
are the appropriate vehicle for providing compensation to the victims of
terrorism, especially so-called "catastrophic terrorism," where the total
damage suffered numbers in the millions.2 31 It is noteworthy that on Sep-
tember 22, 2001, Congress adopted legislation that, for the first time in
U.S. history, set up a disaster compensation system for compensating the
victims of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (both
passengers on the aircraft as well as other victims of the disaster).232 To
seek an award from the fund, claimants had to waive their right to sue over
the disaster, a requirement intended to limit airline liability but, by its
terms, not limited to suits against airlines. 233 It therefore covered any law-
suits filed or to be filed against terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism
based on the events of September 11 th. As of April 2, 2004, the Victim
Compensation Fund had paid $2.6 billion to 7,371 victims; the average
payout to the relatives of victims at that point was $1.8 million, with awards
ranging from $250,000 to $7 million. 23 4 The Fund completed the process-
ing and award determinations for all claims filed with the program on
June 15, 2004. In his closing statement, the Special Master of the Fund,
Kenneth R. Feinberg, reported that "[olver 98% of eligible families who
lost a loved one voluntarily decided to participate and submitted claims to
the Fund. At the same time, over 4,400 physical injury applications were
processed by the Fund."235
There remains, however, the issue posed most starkly by the passage
of the Victims Compensation Act: how to effect equitable compensation
for all United States victims of international terrorism, rather than just for
victims of the event of September 11th or for victims who, despite difficul-
ties erected by the executive branch, have managed to recover on their
judgments against the frozen assets of Cuba and Iran. Congress has recog-
nized the problem. Title VI, Section 626(a) and (b) of the legislation ap-
propriating monies for the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State,
230. See Matthew L. Wald, Bloc of Lockerbie Families Urges End to Libya Penalties,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A10.
231. For an especially thorough and thoughtful examination of this issue, see
Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 627 (2003).
232. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2004)). The
victim compensation program is contained in Title IV of the Act. See September
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
233. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
234. BigNewsNetwork.com, Sept. 11 Victim Fund Pays Out $2.6 Billion (Apr. 1,
2004), available at http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/?sid=121ccefd9b53dlbd.
235. U.S. Dep't of Justice, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Clos-
ing Statement from the Special Master, Mr. R Feinberg on the Shutdown of the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ victimcompensation/closingstatement.pdf.
[Vol. 50: p. 375
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/1
BRAvE NEW WORLD
the Judiciary and related agencies for fiscal year 2002,236 which was
adopted and signed into law on November 29, 2001, provides:
Sec. 626. (a) The President shall submit, by not later than
the time of submission of the Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment for Fiscal Year 2003, a legislative proposal to establish a
comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt
compensation for all United States victims of international ter-
rorism (or relatives of deceased United States victims of interna-
tional terrorism) that occurred or occurs on or after November
1, 1979.
(b) The legislative proposal shall include, among other
things, which types of events should be covered; which categories
of individuals should be covered by a compensation program; the
means by which United States victims of prior or future acts of
international terrorism, including those with hostage claims
against foreign states, will be covered; the establishment of a Spe-
cial Master to administer the program; the categories of injuries
for which there should be compensation; the process by which
any collateral source of compensation to a victim (or a relative of
a deceased victim for an act of international terrorism shall be
offset from any compensation that may be paid to that victim or
that relative) under the program established by this section; and
identifiable sources of funds including assets of any state sponsor
of terrorism to make payments under the program.23 7
The need for such a comprehensive program would become espe-
cially acute, if, heaven forbid, there were future acts of "catastrophic ter-
rorism" that involved the death of large numbers of U.S. citizens. Under
such circumstances, relief through the normal procedures of the tort sys-
tem would be clearly inadequate. 23 8 Unfortunately, at this writing the
President has not yet submitted a proposal for an alternative program.
V. COERCIVE MEAsuREs AGAINST STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OTHER
THAN THE USE OF ARMED FORCE
The focus of this section of the Article is on economic sanctions
against state sponsors of terrorism, and more specifically, mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter. Economic sanctions imposed unilaterally by the
United States, or in concert with like-minded states, not pursuant to Secur-
ity Council mandate, are outside the scope of this Article.
236. Departments of Commerce,Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626, 115 Stat. 748, 803.
237. Id.
238. For some thoughts on the form an alternative program might take, see
Alexander, supra note 231, at 661-89.
2005]
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Although it was its invasion of Kuwait rather than its sponsorship of
terrorism that precipitated Security Council action against Iraq, in its far
reaching Resolution 687,239 the Council "[r]equires Iraq to inform the
Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terror-
ism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to
operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce
all acts, methods and practices of terrorism." 240 Evidence that Iraq failed
to carry out this requirement was considerable. 24 1
Economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council against Iraq be-
came a highly contentious issue, with critics contending that they hurt the
people but not the government of Iraq and that the Security Council ac-
tions were lacking in legitimacy because of dominance by the permanent
members. 242 To meet these criticisms and to ensure the continuance of
economic sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council, beginning in 2001
and continuing in 2002, agreed to major revisions of the sanctions, includ-
ing the adoption of new so-called "smart sanctions." 243 Under the new
sanctions regime, U.N. export controls on purely civilian goods purchased
by Iraq were lifted. Indeed, all contracts for export of goods to Iraq under
the Oil-for-Food program were presumed approved unless found to con-
tain items on a "Goods Review List" (GRL). The GRL consisted of so-
called "dual use" items that might have both a legitimate civilian use and a
potential military use in a prohibited nuclear, chemical, biological, ballis-
tic missile or conventional military program. These items were subjected
to additional scrutiny by the Iraq Sanctions Committee, established by the
Security Council. Security Council Resolution 687 remained in force, with
its requirements that Iraq destroy its nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons programs, and limit its ballistic missile range to 150km.
Because the invasion of Iraq in May 2003 removed the Saddam Hus-
sein regime from power, there was insufficient time to see whether the
"smart" sanctions would be any more effective than the old "dumb" sanc-
tions in inducing Iraq to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 687. It is
now clear, however, that they would not have made any difference. As
noted in excruciating detail in the Comprehensive Report of the SpecialAdvisor
to the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on Iraq's WMD [Weapons of Mass
239. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. (1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 847 (1991).
240. Id. 32.
241. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001 65 (May
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization10296.pdf.
242. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Security Council 18 WASH. Q.
3 (1995).
243. See S.C. Res. 1409, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4531st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1409 (2002); S.C. Res. 1382, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4431st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1382 (2001).
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Destruction] (the "Comprehensive Report"), 244 in 1996, with the beginning of
the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq was able to increase its revenues from "an
estimated $250 million in 1996 to $2.76 billion in 2001."245 The result of
this large infusion of cash was that "[t]he UN system for controlling Iraqi
oil exports had the unintended consequence of allowing ample opportu-
nities for corruption. Corruption of this process suited the objectives of
Saddam of escaping the fetters of the sanctions controlled by the UN Se-
curity Council.
24 6
Saddam apparently had a lot of help in "escaping the fetters of the
sanctions controlled by the UN Security Council." According to a New
York Times analysis of the Comprehensive Report, "Saddam Hussein spent
heavily on arms imports starting in 1999, finding six governments and pri-
vate companies from a dozen other nations that were willing to ignore
sanctions prohibiting arms sales .... ,,247 Reportedly, French government
officials and business executives may have been among those who ac-
cepted bribes from Saddam to help ease the sanctions imposed by the
Security Council. 248
The abject failure of the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq,
then, stand in sharp contrast to the successful outcome of the sanctions
imposed against Libya. Sadly, the overall record of Security Council sanc-
tions against state sponsors of terrorism is not impressive. 249 Economic
sanctions imposed by the Security Council are often regarded as an alter-
native to the use of armed force in dealing with state sponsors of terror-
ism. To the extent they are ineffective in inducing a state sponsor to desist
from its actions, the risk of resort to armed force increases substantially.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The "Brave New World" described earlier in this Article may safely be
said to have ushered in an "age of anxiety." This anxiety has contributed
244. Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on
Iraq's WMD (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs-
WMDVoll.pdf.
245. Id. at 10.
246. Id.
247. See Eric Lipton & Scott Shane, The Conflict in Iraq: The Sanctions; U.S.
Report Says Hussein Bought Arms with Ease, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at Al, col.2.
248. See Craig S. Smith, The Conflict in Iraq: Oilfor Food; French Play Down Report
of Bribes in Iraq Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at A 14, col.4. Saddam reportedly
worked directly with "governments in Syria, Belarus, Yemen, North Korea, the for-
mer Yugoslavia and possibly Russia . . . ." Lipton & Shane, supra note 247, at Al,
col.2. France's military industry supposedly had "extensive contacts with Iraqi offi-
cials," as did "private companies from Jordan, China, India, South Korea, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Georgia, Poland, Romania, Taiwan, Italy and
Turkey." Id. at A14, cols. 4-5.
249. For example, Security Council measures against Afghanistan prior to
September 11 th and against Sudan were ineffective. For discussion, see John F.
Murphy, International Law and the War on Terrorism: The Road Ahead, in 32 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK ON HuMAN RIGHTS 117, 152 (2002).
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mightily to the sharp division of opinion, both in the United States and in
other countries, over how to deal with this "Brave New World". Some of
these differences are reflected in the articles in this symposium. The dis-
cussion and the debate will surely continue for some time to come.
One may fervently hope, however, that in the future we will be less
concerned with the law of armed conflict and the constraints placed on
the use of armed force by the U.N. Charter and more involved in coopera-
tive efforts to prevent and punish international crimes. One may further
hope that such cooperative efforts will result in a better balance between
law enforcement and the protection of human rights, so Abu Ghraib may
become a distant memory.
Lastly, it is worth noting that both George Orwell's and Aldous Hux-
ley's dystopias eliminated human freedom, although their techniques for
doing so differed. The primary challenge facing us now is to ensure not
only the survival of freedom, but also its flourishing on a worldwide basis.
This is a challenge we must not fail to meet.
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